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FROM CITIZENSHIP TO CUSTODY: UNWED FATHERS
ABROAD AND AT HOME
ALBERTINA ANTOGNINI*
The sex-based distinctions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA") have been remarkably resilient in the face of numer-
ous equal protection challenges. In Miller v. Albright, Nguyen v.
INS, and most recently United States v. Flores-Villar-collectively
the "citizenship transmission cases"-the Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of the INA's provisions that require un-
wed fathers, but not unwed mothers, to take a series of affirmative
steps in order to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad.
The conventional account of these citizenship transmission
cases is that the Court upholds sex-based distinctions that would
otherwise fail heightened scrutiny because the immigration and
citizenship context in which they arise typically affords plenary
power to Congress. This Article argues that the conventional ac-
count is incomplete. The citizenship transmission cases are not
best understood as examples of immigration law exceptionalism.
To the contrary, they are remarkably consistent with the Court's
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers in its equal protection ju-
risprudence generally. An in-depth comparison of the citizenship
transmission cases with the Court's decisions regarding the rights
of unwed fathers in a variety of other legal contexts reveals a uni-
form picture of how the Court approaches parental roles in the
absence of a marital union-the Court assumes that the absence of
legal ties with the father at the time of his child's birth results in
his real absence for purposes of establishing both paternity and a
father-child relationship. The corollary to the unwed father's ab-
sence is the unwed mother's presence-the unwed mother is pre-
sumed throughout these decisions to remain with the child.
Underlying both the INA and the Court's decisions endorsing
the statute is therefore a consistent custody determination: the un-
wed mother, whether she is foreign or American, is understood to
invariably retain custody over the child. This Article evaluates the
potential consequences of making explicit the custody determina-
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tion that is implicit in the Court's citizenship transmission cases;
uncovering the custody decision assumed by these rules, and as-
sessing it on its own terms, provides reasons to question this recur-
ring sex-based determination. This Article concludes by noting an
important limitation of focusing on the gender-related aspects of
the statute, namely the exclusion of any discussion concerning its
citizenship-related repercussions.
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INTRODUCTION
Few sex-based distinctions survive heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Yet those that distinguish between unwed American fathers and mothers are
remarkably resilient. Section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") contains one such distinction: under its provisions, an unwed
American mother who has a child abroad with a non-American partner trans-
mits her citizenship automatically to her child, while an unwed American
father in the same position can do so only after satisfying a series of affirma-
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tive requirements, including agreeing in writing to provide financial support
to his child until the child is eighteen years old.'
The Supreme Court has upheld the difference between fathers and
mothers in the face of equal protection challenges brought by unwed Ameri-
can fathers first in Miller v. Albright,2 and then again a few years later in
Nguyen v. INS.3 Scholars have been uniform in their agreement that these
cases are "sexist, narrow-minded, and patently conservative. '4 Yet the Court
has continued to confirm the constitutionality of the INA's distinctions. Two
terms ago, it had occasion to revisit the issue in Flores-Villar v. United
States, where it affirmed the lower court's opinion, once more upholding a
similar sex-based classification in an evenly split per curiam opinion.5
The conventional account of why these "citizenship transmission"
cases survive heightened scrutiny is that the Court eschews the analysis it
typically applies to sex-based distinctions for something weaker. 6 Scholars
and practitioners have attempted to explain this weaker scrutiny by pointing
I Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 309(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c)
(2006).
2 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (plurality opinion).
3 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
'See Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimi-
nation in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 245-50 (2003) (discussing the
nearly unanimous scholarly response to the Court's decisions in Miller and Nguyen). The
criticisms are premised on varying reasons and normative ends, but they have consist-
ently focused on the Court's simplification of the role of men and women in their roles as
fathers and mothers. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Found-
ing Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1282 (2005) ("The picture of
men as unemotional, unattached sexual beings with no connection to the children they
father is astounding and deeply troubling."); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright:
Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1160 (1999)
(criticizing the Court for simplifying the complexities of family law in favor of
constitutionalization).
1 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam). Miller, Nguyen and Flores-Villar are difficult
cases, as indicated by the frequent split between the justices. However, all three are con-
sistent in upholding the sex-based distinctions.
6 See, e.g., Jacqueline Barrett, Notes & Comments, Nguyen v. INS: Are Sex-Based
Citizenship Laws Really Constitutional?, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 391, 403 (2002)
("While the Nguyen court recited [the] standard for heightened scrutiny of gender-based
classifications, it failed to follow precedent in the field."); Morgan G. Miranda, Note, A
(Stateless) Stranger in a Strange Land: Flores-Villar and the Potential for Statelessness
Under U.S. Law, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 379, 414-15 (2012) (noting that "the
majority in Nguyen, though purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, applied a standard
more akin to rational basis"); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical
Scrutiny of Plenary Power, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 18 (1998) ("Under modem equal
protection doctrine... Section 309(a) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act] imper-
missibly uses sex as an inexact proxy for other attributes of unwed parents, fosters stereo-
types that 'reflect and reinforce historical patterns of discrimination,' and eschews sex-
neutral standards that could serve the government's purposes as well or better.") (citation
omitted); Debra L. Satinoff, Comment, Sex-Based Discrimination in U.S. Immigration
Law: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between What We Say and
What We Do, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353, 1391 (1998) (noting that the Court has subjected
the line of cases since Fiallo to a "facially legitimate scrutiny test" and that "[r]ecently,
the Supreme Court, although purportedly not applying the Fiallo test, could not reach any
consensus about how sex-based immigration or 'citizenship' laws should be analyzed").
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to the context in which the decisions are made, arguing that because the
Court is considering issues related to citizenship, it applies the extreme judi-
cial deference known as plenary power that is found in immigration law.7
The concern over immigration law exceptionalism8 has led a number of
scholars, joined by some of the Justices, to urge the Court to consider these
cases not to be about inmiigration or even citizenship, but rather to address
them as decisions about the rights of American citizen mothers and fathers. 9
Implicit in these claims is the assumption that the Court treats unwed fathers
and mothers differently than it would in a purely domestic context, and up-
holds otherwise outdated sex-based distinctions because of the anomalous
context of citizenship and immigration. °
See, e.g., Nina Pillard, Case Comment, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v.
INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 846-47 (2002) ("Rather
than viewing the distortions in the Court's equal protection analysis as evidence that it
was straining to avoid overt reliance on the plenary power doctrine, we could equally
understand the version of equal protection that the Court applied [in Nguyen] as ...
employing the functional equivalent of plenary power deference without acknowledging
that it is doing so."); Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigra-
tion Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 628-29 (2008) ("Though Justice Kennedy
claims not to address whether the plenary power should continue to modify the scrutiny
given to federal government's classifications [in Nguyen], it is difficult to accept his
equal protection analysis without a suspicion that the special context of immigration is
influencing the outcome."); Weinrib, supra note 4 at 248 ("The most palpable difference
between [Nguyen] and other equal protection decisions, including those involving non-
marital children, is that Nguyen is about immigration and citizenship.").
8 See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1062 (1994) (explaining "immigration law exceptional-
ism" whereby "[c]ourts have routinely emphasized that constitutional principles applica-
ble elsewhere are of little effect within the immigration domain."); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts,
22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925, 937 (1995) ("Immigration commentators are well aware
that our field has long been a constitutional oddity. For the most part, the Supreme Court
has not applied to immigration cases the constitutional norms familiar in other areas of
public law.").
9 See, e.g. Kristin Collins & Linda Kerber, Sexing Citizenship, SLATE, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/urisprudence/2010/1 I/sexing-citizen
ship.single.html ("Flores-Villar isn't a case about keeping out illegal immigrants. It is a
case about the rights of American mothers and fathers to equal protection of the law.");
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 476-78 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
because "[t]his case is about American citizenship and its transmission from an Ameri-
can parent to his child" rather than the "naturalization of aliens" then "the same standard
of review must apply when a married American couple travel abroad or temporarily work
abroad and have a child as when a single American parent has a child born abroad out of
wedlock").
"
0 See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, The 2000-2001 Supreme Court Term On Women's
Rights: A Mixed Bag of Split Decisions, FINDLAW (July 3, 2001), http://writ.news.find
law.com/grossman/20010703.html (arguing that "Nguyen turns back the clock nearly
three decades, eroding the equal protection jurisprudence that had been successfully elim-
inating gender-based stereotypes from the law."); Aubry Holland, Comment, The Modem
Family Unit: Toward a More Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 CAL.
L. REV. 1049, 1085 (2008) (arguing generally that "[u]nlike the advancements made in
family law, immigration policies have failed to adequately modernize and accommodate
the growth of non-traditional family structures," noting that unmarried fathers have been
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This Article argues that the conventional understanding of the citizen-
ship transmission cases is critically incomplete. These cases are not best de-
scribed as examples of immigration law exceptionalism. Rather, in
determining the respective rights of unwed American fathers and mothers to
transmit citizenship to their children born abroad, the Court relies directly on
its treatment of unwed American fathers and mothers in its equal protection
doctrine domestically. This point has been mostly overlooked in the litera-
ture, and there has yet to be an in-depth analysis comparing the laws gov-
erning unwed parents in the citizenship transmission to those in other state
law contexts.1 That analysis is the principal task of this Article.
Somewhat complicating this undertaking is the fact that the INA and
the family it addresses sit uneasily on the border of two "exceptional"
fields.12 The sections of the INA addressing citizenship do not clearly fall
within the plenary power doctrine of immigration law,' 3 and many unwed
fathers and mothers fall outside of what is traditionally considered to be
family law. 14 The family indicated by the provisions of the INA exists on the
recognized in family law where they have undertaken custodial or personal responsibility
over their children).
' A small number of scholars have noted the similarities in the Court's treatment of
unwed parents although in different contexts and varying depth. See, e.g., Kim Shayo
Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1175-97 (2010) (addressing the
similarities among equal protection cases concerning "[illicit heterosex," in arguing
more broadly that the Court applies a less demanding equal protection analysis in cases
involving the consequences of illicit sex); Gabriel J. Chin, Essay, Is There a Plenary
Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMM. L.J. 257, 258 (2000) (arguing that many
cases understood to be a product of plenary power would have come out the same domes-
tically, including those addressing race, Communist affiliation, and sex and illegitimacy);
Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal
Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (2000) (suggesting that
heightened scrutiny, as shown by Miller, is ill-equipped to address the question of paren-
tal rights because "both weak and strong applications of the equal protection test fail to
reveal the coercive nature of the legal regime underlying § 1409"); Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 430 (2007) (arguing that the
constitutional test applied to unwed fathers throughout the Court's equal protection juris-
prudence including the cases addressing citizenship should apply to the consideration of
surrogacy contracts and reproductive technology).
12 While immigration law exceptionalism has been nearly entirely defined by judicial
deference, see supra note 8, "family law exceptionalism" has been considered to be more
widespread and refers to "the myriad ways in which the family and its law are deemed,
either descriptively, or normatively, to be special." Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical
Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Fam-
ily Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 753 (2010).
13 Given that the Court upheld the sex-based distinctions between unmarried parents
for the transmission of citizenship to children born abroad under equal protection scru-
tiny, the Court explained that "[it] need not decide whether some lesser degree of scru-
tiny pertains because the statute implicates Congress' immigration and naturalization
power." Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001).
11 For instance, standard family law textbooks do not consider many of the unwed
mother and father cases. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN ET AL., JR., FAMILY LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS xx (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) (including Lalli v. Lalli, but
excluding Trimble v. Gordon and Gomez v. Perez, cases about inheritance and child sup-
port, respectively, where the parents are unmarried). I use the terms "family" and "fam-
2013]
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border in two other ways-it lies outside of a legally recognized relationship
as the man and woman are unwed, and outside of the territory of the United
States as these rules only become relevant abroad. 5
Yet a close reading of the Court's equal protection cases addressing
unwed parents across borders, both geographical and doctrinal, shows that
its decisions consistently reflect an assumption that the unwed father is ab-
sent and the unwed mother is present-not just at birth but in the child's life
thereafter. As a result, the unwed father at home and abroad must prove both
a biological link and an ensuing relationship with his child. 6 Looking be-
yond the citizenship transmission cases to the Court's general treatment of
unwed fathers and mothers reveals that the family designated by the INA-
which I term the "citizen family"-and the family addressed by state law-
which I term the "domestic family"-overlap in core respects. Indeed, it is
sometimes difficult to separate the citizen family, which is composed of the
mixed-status couples before the Court in the citizenship transmission cases,17
from the domestic family, given the Court's myopic focus on the American
parents in its citizenship transmission decisions.
The goal of this Article is not to question immigration law exceptional-
ism, 8 but rather to go beyond what is understood to be exceptional and un-
cover deep-seated similarities that span across different bodies of law
considering the relationship between unwed parents and their children. An
examination of the decisions concerning unwed parents is essential in an era
where the prevalence of births to parents who are unmarried is increasing
ily law" broadly to encompass the formation and dissolution of core relationships
between adults and children.
"5 There are two recognized means of transmitting citizenship based on birth in the
United States: by place, jus soli, which is recognized by the U.S. Constitution, or blood
relation, jus sanguinis, which is recognized by statute. STEPHEN LEGOMSKY& CRISTINA
RODRiGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1290-94 (5th ed. 2009)
(describing each means of citizenship transmission). Both ultimately depend on place of
birth, forjus sanguinis comes into play only outside the borders of the United States. Id.
6 See discussion infra Part III. I use the term "unwed father" to describe the male
parent of a nonmarital child so as to not have to rely on the "legitimate" or "illegitimate"
status of the child, unless the characterization of a particular case or situation requires it.
While the father of a nonmarital child can technically be married at the time, I mean to
invoke the father's relation to the child he has fathered in the absence of a marital rela-
tionship with the child's mother. As a factual matter, none of the citizenship transmission
cases address an otherwise married father at the time of the child's birth. In employing
this term I also aim to equalize the use of "unwed father" and "unwed mother," with full
awareness of the very different socio-cultural connotations surrounding each figure.
17 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998) (noting that the specific challenge in
that case was to "the distinction drawn by INA § 309 between the child of an alien father
and a citizen mother, on the one hand, and the child of an alien mother and a citizen
father, on the other").
18 For one account of plenary power and its repercussions see Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1990) (examining the contradiction
between constitutional norms subject to the plenary power doctrine of immigration law
and "subconstitutional" norms that seem to circumscribe the problems posed by plenary
power).
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domestically and abroad. 9 Although rarely acknowledged, the Court defines
the bounds of the family in its decisions addressing citizenship as it defines
the borders of citizenship in its domestic decisions addressing the treatment
of the family by state laws. 0 It is important to note then where the Court
makes assumptions about unwed American parents domestically and abroad,
and where it extends those assumptions to the non-American halves of the
relationship the INA considers.
Although framed in the terminology of unwed parents, these assump-
tions are, at their most basic, decisions about who will retain custody over
the child. The INA sets forth rules based on the expectation that the mother
will always retain custody in the absence of a marital relationship; and the
Court affirms this sex-based allocation of parental rights, on which citizen-
ship depends. It does so, however, without looking to a contemporary law of
custody that has developed beyond a reliance on explicit gender-based pref-
erences. 21 Thus, embedded in the Court's decisions, is an alternate frame-
work for understanding and ultimately critiquing the contours of the family
incorporated by the citizenship transmission cases-that of custody law,
which is hidden in plain sight.2
'9 In 2007, 39.7% of births were to unmarried women. See Gardiner Harris, Out-of-
Wedlock Birthrates Are Soaring, U.S. Reports, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/13/health/13mothers.html (noting that births to unmarried women
are also increasing in Iceland and Sweden). See also STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, NAT'L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CHANGING PAITERNS OF NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE
UNITED STATES, NCHS DATA BRIEF, No. 18, (May 2009), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/databriefs/dbl 8.htm.
20 Family law textbooks do not include Fiallo, or for that matter Miller, or Nguyen, in
their discussions of custody or paternity. See, e.g., AREEN et al., supra note 14, at 376-83,
524-34, 984-1000 (discussing unmarried fathers, children born out of wedlock and cus-
tody issues between unmarried couples without any mention of Fiallo, Miller, or Nguyen;
including the Ninth Circuit's decision in Flores-Villar under the section addressing mar-
riage, sex-discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment without any reference to pater-
nity, custody, or children born out of wedlock). Scholars have, however, initiated the call
to awareness of the various ways in which family and immigration law overlap some
years ago. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91
MINN. L. REv. 1625, 1631-32 (2007) ("Just as family law scholarship has neglected to
consider immigration law as family law, immigration scholarship has largely passed by
the family law aspects of immigration."); Kristin Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The
Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1761, 1762-69 (2005) (examining the federal government's role in the regulation
of the family and arguing that the paradigm of state sovereignty over domestic relations
should be understood as an "invention").
21 See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child Custody Law Over the
Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 451, 454-55 (2012) (describing how
after the 1970s legislatures and courts systematically wiped out the "tender years" doc-
trine and replaced it with a gender neutral "best interests of the child" standard).22 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNNER, MINDING THE LAW 113
(2000) ("Well-wrought narratives are so successful in making their answers to [ ] ques-
tions seem like 'the real thing' that they virtually blind us to the subtle architecture of
their construction."); see also discussion infra Part III.
2013]
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes Fiallo v. Bell,23 the
first Supreme Court case to consider an equal protection challenge to the
INA's treatment of the unwed father in the context of immigration legisla-
tion. Because Fiallo, decided squarely as an immigration case, is understood
to be emblematic of the plenary power doctrine, it is not typically analyzed
in conjunction with Miller, Nguyen, or Flores-Villar, in the treatment of sex-
based distinctions.2 4 Fiallo, however, sets forth the two central justifications
for differentiating between unwed fathers and mothers that have defined the
Court's citizenship jurisprudence in the subsequent four decades: the per-
ceived absence of family ties between unwed fathers and their children, and
the lurking problems of proof that arise in paternity determinations. While
there is no dispute that plenary power dictates Fiallo's analysis, I argue that
its effect is evidenced not in the substance of its joint justifications, which
are taken directly from the Court's cases considering unwed parents in the
state statutes of the time, but in the absence of any elaboration for its
reasons.
Part II examines how these justifications are maintained and expanded
in the citizenship transmission context beginning with Miller25 and ending
with Flores-Villar,26 which left differential sex-based residency requirements
intact. The deference that characterized Fiallo's adherence to plenary power
is replaced by the discussion of "real" difference 27 in the Court's decisions
that directly assess the equal protection challenges. These two Parts focus on
the mother and father figures, which are not initially considered in conjunc-
tion and are only gradually brought into a direct comparison by the Court in
its citizenship and domestic state law cases. 28 Part II concludes by disclosing
23 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
24 But see Kristin A. Collins, Fiallo v. Bell in Congress: Plenary Power, Coordinate
Branches, and Gender-Based Nationality Laws (forthcoming) (on file with the author)
(tracing the significance of Fiallo in both Congress and the courts with the aim of contex-
tualizing the transmission of citizenship cases within the larger institutional life of the
plenary power doctrine); Satinoff, supra note 6, at 1358-64 (analyzing Fiallo in conjunc-
tion with Miller, which at the time were the only two cases to have been decided by the
Court).
25 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
26 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011) (per curiam).
27 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The difference
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one .... ").
28 The focus of this Article is on the father, the mother, and their unwed status, rather
than on the child and his or her "illegitimacy." While the issue of illegitimacy is certainly
relevant, this Article examines instead the Court's treatment of the parents, and their
relation. This focus mimics the law's treatment of citizenship transmission both in the
INA and by the Court in the citizenship transmission cases. Since 1995, the INA no
longer distinguishes on the basis of "legitimacy" or "illegitimacy," but on the basis of
"in wedlock" and "out of wedlock" which refers to the relations between the parents.
Immigration and Nationality Act, Amendment, PUB. L. No. 104-51, § 1, 109 Stat. 467
(1995) (codified as amended at INA § 309; 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006)) (defining the applica-
tion of citizenship and nationality laws to children "born out of wedlock."). For a consid-
eration of the different treatment of unwed father and mothers through the lens of
illegitimacy, see Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REv. 73, 83 (2003) (discussing Nguyen v. INS and Fiallo v. Bell as examples
[Vol. 36
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the custody determination that underlies both the INA and the Court's opin-
ions, thereby identifying an alternative framework to understand the citizen-
ship transmission cases.
Part III presents the potential repercussions of addressing this custody
determination directly. I suggest that the Court's reliance on the unwed fa-
ther and mother paradigm in determining citizenship is unnecessary. A better
approach would be for the Court to acknowledge explicitly the custody de-
termination that is implicit in its analysis and to make use of the insights
provided by contemporary custody law. Unlike the Court's current ap-
proach-which compares the unwed U.S. citizen mother with the unwed
U.S. citizen father in what becomes an abstracted and strictly American fam-
ily-adopting a custody-like framework overtly would force the Court to
address the two mixed-status parents and their child before it. The turn to-
ward custody would also require the Court to openly decide rather than
surmise which parent will remain with the child, a decision that custody law
directly considers. Finally, this custody-based critique elaborates on views
already raised, piecemeal, in the Court's dissenting voices and the parties'
articulation of the harm caused by differentiating between unwed parents
based on sex.29
This Article concludes by questioning the Court's focus on hetero-
normative notions of motherhood and fatherhood, which persist even within
a custody framework. The emphasis on the sex-based nature of the INA's
distinctions may also not be conducive to reviewing how the regulation of
citizenship takes place. Rather, such an emphasis may conceal considera-
tions regarding the limits set on the number of citizens recognized by the
statute and their potentially race-based repercussions. Ultimately, the aim
here is to enable critical consideration of the concepts that are being em-
ployed, under an account that reveals how they are being deployed.
I. IMMIGRATION DEFERENCE AND DENIAL OF DIFFERENCE:
FIALLO V. BELL
Despite its laconic take on unwed fathers and their children, Fiallo v.
Bell set forth the framework the Court adheres to in its decisions regarding
the citizen family to this day. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, upheld
the exclusion of unwed fathers, but not unwed mothers, from the statutory
definition of a parent-child relationship.30 While Fiallo was decided under
of sex-based illegitimacy classifications); Linda K. Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied:
The Politics of Gender and Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 129, 150-53 (2006) (describing unequal citizenship transmission law as an
example of Congress exercising "the bias of bastardy against non-marital fathers").
29 While this turn may counsel a move away from equal protection entirely, see
Silbaugh, supra note 4, it is not a necessary implication and can merely supplement,
rather than displace, the current constitutional framework.
30Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
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the judicial deference required by immigration legislation, the subsequent
citizenship transmission cases have preserved this distinction between un-
wed parents under the intermediate scrutiny applied to sex-based
categorizations. 3'
The Court sanctioned the exclusion of unwed fathers and their children
from attaining preferential immigration status by virtue of their parent-child
relationship, which would have enabled the recipient to, depending on the
situation, bypass the applicable numerical quotas or the labor certification
requirement. 2 In so doing, Fiallo provided two central justifications for why
unwed fathers and their children could reasonably be excluded: the absence
of family ties between unwed father and child, and problems with proving
paternity.3 The Court, however, reached its decision without addressing the
presence of the family directly, instead equating it with any other entity Con-
gress regulates in the realm of immigration where the scope of judicial re-
view is "limited." 34
This Part begins by addressing the two justifications laid out by Fiallo
and situates them squarely within the terrain of decisions addressing unwed
American fathers and mothers in state law. It follows with an analysis of
how the standard of review dictated by the plenary power doctrine allowed a
near total absence in the Court's opinion of a discussion of the family recog-
nized by immigration law.
A. Dual Justifications: "Perceived Absence" of Family Ties and
"Problems of Proof That Usually Lurk"
Fiallo involved a challenge brought by three fathers and their biological
children to Section 101(b)(1) of the INA alleging equal protection and due
process violations based on a finding that they were statutorily ineligible for
preferential immigration status.3" Upholding Section 101(b)(1)'s exclusion of
unwed fathers from the definition of "parent," and their children born
outside of marriage from the definition of "child,"36 the Court emphasized
its limited role and briefly reasoned: "Congress obviously has determined
31 I refrain here from engaging in the debate as to whether the scrutiny for sex-based
distinctions in general has been heightened by United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996). See discussion infra note 297.
32 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789-90.
33 Id. at 799.
4Id. at 792.
31 Id. at 791. Appellants challenged the constitutionality of INA § 101(b)(1), defining
child, and § 101(b)(2), defining parent, on the basis of the First, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.
36 INA § 101(b)(1) defined a child as an unmarried person under twenty-one who is a
legitimate or legitimated child, stepchild, or adopted child or an illegitimate child of a
natural mother. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1958) (current version at INA
§ 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(l) (2006)). The definition for who constituted a parent
under the statute relies on the definition of "child." INA § 101(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(2) (1958) (current version at INA § 101(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(2) (2006)).
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that preferential status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their
natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of
close family ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that
usually lurk in paternity determinations. 3 7 In choosing these two particular
bases to rely on, the Court articulated its reasoning in terms of that which
cannot actually be observed-a perceived38 absence as opposed to an actual
one, and lurking3 9 problems of proof as opposed to present ones. Together,
the "perceived absence" of close family ties and the concern with "serious
problems of proof that usually lurk" in paternity decisions have enabled pro-
visions of the INA differentiating between men and women in their parental
roles to withstand various equal protection challenges.
Stated without much elaboration, these justifications seem difficult to
reconcile with the Court's treatment of unwed fathers and their children in its
domestic equal protection decisions. A few years prior to Fiallo, the Court
held in Stanley v. Illinois that the statutory exclusion of unwed fathers from
a definition of "parent" in a dependency proceeding was constitutionally
unacceptable, violating due process and equal protection.40 Addressing the
treatment of unwed fathers by Illinois law in Trimble v. Gordon, the Court
similarly held that problems of proof with paternity determinations "do not
justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers
die intestate." 4'
While some scholars consider the Court's holding in Fiallo to be plainly
contradictory to the principles articulated in cases like Stanley or Trimble,42 a
continuous theme runs through all these cases: an unwed father, unlike an
unwed mother, begins from an absence he must refute both in terms of prov-
ing paternity and establishing the existence of a parental relationship with
37 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
38 "To apprehend through one of the senses, esp. sight; to become aware of by seeing,
hearing, etc.; to see; to detect." Perceive Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http:/
/www.oed.com/view/Entry/140537 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (subscription required).
39 "Of things: To escape observation, to be concealed or latent." Lurk Definition,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/111322 (last visited
Mar. 28, 2013) (subscription required).
40 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-59 (1972).
41 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977). There is some scholarship that addresses Fiallo in con-
junction with the proof of paternity cases such as Trimble; those that do, however, are in
the illegitimacy context, which assume, rather than assess, the overlap among the deci-
sions. See, e.g., Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the
United States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 19-31 (1999) (discussing Fiallo and other
federal cases addressing illegitimacy in surveying the Supreme Court cases between 1968
and 1989).
42 See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failure of Legal Images, 51 HAS-
TINGS L. J. 557, 573-74 (2000) (contrasting the decision in Fiallo v. Bell with other cases
of the time, including Stanley v. Illinois); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exception-
alism: Commentary on Is There A Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307,
310-11 (2000) (offering the contradiction between the decisions in Trimble v. Gordon
and Fiallo v. Bell as proof of immigration law exceptionalism).
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his child. A comparison of the family in both contexts reveals that the
Court's treatment of the citizen family and the domestic family are more
similar than they are distinct.
1. "Perceived Absence" of Family Ties
The "perceived absence ... of family ties"43 between father and child
kept a discussion of the family largely absent from the Court's decision in
Fiallo, given that little justification is required for what is visibly not there.
This perceived absence was also present in Stanley, functioning as the base-
line from which the Court allowed the unwed father "to make his case." 44
Both decisions were reached without addressing the difference in treatment
between unwed fathers and mothers directly. Stanley compared the unwed
father with all other Illinois parents, and Fiallo evaluated whether the unwed
father was similar to the INA's other statutory exclusions, which addressed
children.45 The unwed mother's absence from the Court's opinions implied
her presence with respect to her child-to the Court, the mother's family ties
were too obvious to address.
In both the immigration and domestic equal protection cases, the unwed
father begins from an absence-the absence of the legal tie of marriage-
which the Court extends to indicate an absence of real ties with his children.
The demand for proof of the unwed father's relationship with his children
relies heavily on the legitimation paradigm-in demonstrating a bona fide
relationship with his child, the father does the work that legitimating a child,
through marriage or other means, would have accomplished. The Court in
Stanley held that states may not discriminate against unwed fathers by
presuming them unfit parents, but left undisturbed the fact that states may
hinge their legal recognition of the unwed father on requiring him to prove
his relationship by affirmative, legally cognizable acts, equivalent to the af-
firmative act of marriage.46 Fiallo rigidly instituted Stanley's assumption of
paternal absence, with no opportunity for even a hearing to prove the
exception.
The limited reference to the family that took place in Fiallo was in the
context of recognizing that the provision granting preferential immigration
status was aimed at keeping families united.47 Unwed fathers, however, were
excluded from this family in the first instance. Justice Powell justified the
41 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977).
44 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1972).
4' Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797-99.
46 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9, 658-59 (1972) ("Extending opportunity
for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim competence to care for their children
creates no constitutional or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who
are not so inclined.")
" Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795 n.6 ("It is true that the legislative history of the provision at
issue here establishes that congressional concern was directed at the problem of keeping
families of United States citizens and immigrants united.") (internal citations omitted).
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exclusion by looking to the legislative history of the INA, where he empha-
sized Congress's specific concern with the plight of the unwed mother.41
Noting that unwed fathers were not the intended beneficiaries of the amend-
ments, Justice Powell concluded that they were reasonably excluded from
the family that Congress intended to reunite. 49
Despite the appearance of the unwed mother in the discussion of the
Act's legislative history, the Court in Fiallo avoided a direct comparison
with the father. Instead, the Court compared the exclusion of the unwed
father from preferential immigration status under INA Section 101(b)(1),
with the exclusion of a child over twenty-one years of age, or a child who
was adopted after the age of fourteen. 0 That is, the Court compared the
unwed father to grown or married children-the unwed father, similar to the
child over twenty-one years of age, did not exhibit the family ties required
by Congress for preferential immigration status. The unwed mother re-
mained estranged from a comparison with the unwed father and mostly ab-
sent from the Court's opinion. The mothers who were before the Court in
Fiallo, however, did not fit easily into this perception. Nowhere did the
Court mention the mother who left her child, married another, and expressed
a desire to leave her son." Nor did it discuss the mother who supported the
family financially and who chose not to marry,52 or the mother who died. 3
These were the actual mothers in the facts before the Court, yet the only
48 Id. at 797 (discussing amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act in
1957).
4 Id. Compare Brief for Appellees at 16, 38, Fiallo v. Levi, 426 U.S. 919 (1976), sub
nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (No. 75-6297), 1976 WL 181347, at *16, *38
[hereinafter Fiallo Appellees Brief] (explaining that "Congress sought to encourage fam-
ilies to reunify when they became separated by the immigration of a close family member
to the United States, and then only under circumstances where it was likely that the
separation had occasioned extreme emotional, financial, or social hardship to the family,"
arguing that including the children of unwed fathers would not "advance the goal of
reuniting family members who would be living together" given that "[n]o such intimacy
generally exists between natural fathers and their illegitimate children, especially those
who have never chosen to legitimate their son or daughter") with Brief for Appellants at
31-37, Fiallo v. Levi, 426 U.S. 919 (1976), sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
(No. 75-6297), 1976 WL 181347, at *31-37 [hereinafter Fiallo Appellant Brief] (arguing
that the legislative history shows a general aim to reunite the family regardless of legiti-
macy, without focusing on the unwed mother).
So Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797-98. Not all distinctions in the law relating to immigration
preference of immediate relatives are based on age; the one other distinction is based on
the marital status of the child.
5' These are the facts of Cleophus Warner and his son Serge, appellants in Fiallo.
While Serge was visiting his father in the United States, Cleophus received a letter from
Serge's mother saying that she had married, was moving to an undisclosed location, and
did not want Serge to return to her. Serge had been born in the French West Indies. Fiallo
Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at *7-8.
52 Ramon Fiallo-Sone, a citizen from the Dominican Republic, was the primary care-
taker of his son, Ramon Fiallo, while Celia Rodriguez, Ramon Jr.'s mother, worked and
provided for both Ramon and his son; for "personal reasons," the parents decided not to
marry. Id. at *10-11.
"The mother of Trevor and Earl Wilson died in New York. They were unable to
petition for their father to take care of them in the United States and so were living
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mother present in the opinion, foreign or American, was the mother who
remained with her child and who Congress intended to helpA4
The mother was also largely absent from the Court's decisions address-
ing the domestic family, and did not figure prominently in Stanley. Similar
to Fiallo, the Court in Stanley did not engage in a direct comparison between
the two unwed parents; instead, it addressed the equal protection violation
based on the argument that the unwed father was denied a right given to all
other parents."
The Court was not, however, directly presented with the question of
whether a sex-based distinction between unwed fathers and mothers violated
the Constitution.16 Fiallo and Stanley can be further distinguished by Justice
White's acknowledgment in Stanley that the unwed father may have a rela-
tionship with his children. The Stanley Court faced the question of whether
Illinois could constitutionally define "parents" to mean "the father and
mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them; or the natural mother of
an illegitimate child, [including] any adoptive parent, but [ I not [ I] unwed
fathers" for the purpose of a neglect hearing.57 Answering in the negative,
Stanley relied on the aim of the Juvenile Act which, similar to Section
101(b)(1) of the INA, was partly "to strengthen the minor's family ties
whenever possible."58 Discussing the family writ large, the Court asserted
that its decisions have "frequently emphasized the importance of the fam-
ily," noting that the law has not "refused to recognize those family relation-
ships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."5 9 The Court concluded that
Peter Stanley,60 the unwed father, "was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as
without either of their parents. Trevor and Earl, at the time of the lawsuit, were permanent
residents and their father, Arthur Wilson, was in Jamaica. Id. at * 12.
-" The majority of the Court's brief discussion of the mother is during its explanation
of the legislative history, noting "Congress was specifically concerned with the relation-
ship between a child born out of wedlock and his or her natural mother .. " Fiallo, 430
U.S. at 797.
51 The father in Stanley is compared to other parents and not their children. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). Moreover, the decision relies mostly on due process
grounds, rather than on equal protection grounds. See Case Comment, The Emerging
Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1581, 1602 (1972) ("[Slignificantly, in Stanley v. Illinois the Court avoided a clarifica-
tion of the sexual classification issue as well as the fundamental interest issue.").
56 The Supreme Court of Illinois engaged in a direct comparison, holding that "[tihe
distinction between the class of mothers and the class of fathers is rationally related to the
purposes of the Juvenile Court Act .... and thus it is not constitutionally mandated that
Stanley be accorded the rights which accrue to the class of natural mothers of illegitimate
children." Stanley v. Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (I11. 1970). Peter Stanley argued the
equal protection violation in State court, yet enlarged the comparison to encompass all
other parents on appeal before the Supreme Court. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger,
J., dissenting).
7 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
58 Id. at 652 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19 1d. at 651-52.
60 Petitioner's name was introduced in the first line of the opinion, as was the name of
the mother of their children, which was Joan Stanley. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. By con-
trast, the names of Appellants in Fiallo appeared only once in the majority's opinion, in a
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a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by denying him a
hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children
is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
Crucially, however, the Court's decision remained largely at the level of
paternal possibility. It did not assess the actual relationship between Stanley
and his three children, nor did it address the relations between unwed fathers
and their children generally. The only question before the Court was whether
the unwed father merited a hearing prior to having his children taken away
upon the death of their mother. "It may be," the Stanley Court admitted,
"that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents"; or even
that "Stanley is such a parent and that his children should be placed in other
hands. '62 These perceived family ties were not germane to the Court's deci-
sion;63 it was sufficient merely that "all unmarried fathers are not in this
category." 64 The gains made by Stanley were real insofar as the Court re-
jected a "one-dimensional" construction of unwed fathers.65 Yet despite its
bold language, Stanley's holding was limited-it extended only to allow the
unwed father "to make his case. '66
While Fiallo rejected even the opportunity for a hearing given the
Court's blanket reluctance to assess the statute's means vis-A-vis its ends, 67
Stanley did little to attack the conceptual underpinnings Fiallo would later
rely on. Unwed fathers must prove the existence of parental relations, which
are otherwise presumed to be absent. Under the current version of the INA
section that was challenged in Fiallo, the unwed father, like Peter Stanley,
receives only an opportunity to prove that he is in fact "unusual"; 68 he must
show he has a bona fide relationship with his child.69 By contrast, the unwed
mother has no bona fide relationship requirement. 0
footnote. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 n.3 (1977). If anything, this difference tracks
the acknowledgment by the Court of the parties, and the facts, before it.
6' Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
6 2 Id. at 654.
63 The Court's choice to rely on a due process rationale facilitated avoiding this deter-
mination. See discussion supra note 55 (analyzing Stanley's decision to rely principally
on due process instead of equal protection grounds and potential repercussions thereof).
64 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654.
65 Id. at 655.
66 Id.
67 430 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1977).
1 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("Stanley depicts himself as a
somewhat unusual unwed father, namely, as one who has always acknowledged and
never doubted his fatherhood of these children.")
69 The current version of INA § 101(b)(1) still requires some affirmative action on
behalf of the father and not the mother. Amended in 1986, the statute presently reads that
a child born out of wedlock will be considered a child "by virtue of the relationship of
the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if the father has a bona fide parent-
child relationship with the person." Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.
L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending INA §101(b)(1)(D)) (current version at INA§101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(d) (2006)) (emphasis added).70INA §101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(d) (2006).
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2. "Problems of Proof That Usually Lurk"
The second justification Fiallo offered for excluding unwed fathers was
based on "the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity deter-
minations."'" Biological ties were subject to problems of proof abroad and
domestically, and Fiallo relied on a state law case discussing the signifi-
cance of paternity determinations for support.72 While many of the cases
addressing the domestic family differed from Fiallo in outcome-in that the
problems of proof were not insurmountable-the difference can be ex-
plained not by any different views concerning the unwed parents, but largely
by their focus on the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren." This focus also obscured the fact that the state laws in these cases
nearly unanimously placed restrictions on the relationship between the child
and the unwed father, rather than the child and the unwed mother.74 Both
domestically and abroad then, problems were particular to the unwed father
rather than the unwed mother. In the context of immigration, problems that
were merely lurking were sufficient to exclude the unwed father under INA
Section 101(b)(1).
In providing the paternity justification in Fiallo, Justice Powell cited to
Trimble v. Gordon,75 one of the many cases addressing illegitimacy during
the late 1960s and 1970s.76 In Trimble, which he also authored and which
was issued during the same term as Fiallo, Justice Powell explained that
"[o]ur ... decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to 'the lurking problems with
respect to proof of paternity,' and the need ... to draw 'arbitrary lines .. . to
facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof."' 77 Justice Powell did not
find those problems fatal in Trimble, holding that the exclusion of illegiti-
mate, but not legitimate, children from the ability to inherit from their fa-
thers violated equal protection.78  Acknowledging the difficulties in
7 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
721 Id. (relying on Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)).
73 See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 (reasoning that while "parents have the ability
to conform their conduct to societal norms, [ I] their illegitimate children can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status" in striking down a statute that dis-
criminated against illegitimate children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)
(striking down a statute that excluded illegitimate children from a right to support from
their natural fathers, reasoning that "a State may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally").
See also discussion infra notes 83-91.
74 See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764 (statute excluding the illegitimate child of a
natural father from inheriting his estate); Gomez, 409 U.S. at 535 (statute granting a right
of support to the legitimate, but not illegitimate, children of the natural father); Weber,
406 U.S. at 164 (statute preventing the illegitimate child of a natural father from recover-
ing workmen's compensation benefit). See also discussion infra notes 83-91.
75 Trimble, 430 U.S. 762.
76 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 766 n. 11 (listing cases and noting "[Fiallo] represents the 12th
time since 1968 that we have considered the constitutionality of alleged discrimination on
the basis of illegitimacy.").
7' Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771 (citations omitted).
78 Id. at 765-66, 772.
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determining paternity, he nevertheless reasoned that while "'[tihose
problems are not to be lightly brushed aside, [ ] neither can they be made
into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious
discrimination.' 79
The Court heeded problems in Fiallo that it did not in Trimble or in the
other cases addressing proof of paternity in the context of state law classifi-
cations. Yet the difference in outcome is not properly located in a different
understanding of the roles of the unwed parents, or in the substantive effect
of plenary power; rather, it is better located in the Court's focus on the chil-
dren in the domestic state law cases.80 That is, while the paternity determina-
tion in Fiallo was raised in the context of a child's relation vis-t-vis the
unwed parent, the domestic cases compared the differential treatment be-
tween children, legitimate and illegitimate, a choice largely dictated by peti-
tioners." Thus, an important basis for the distinction between the cases is
how the equal protection challenge was framed-whether it addressed the
children or the parents.8 2
The domestic cases considering proof of paternity did not have to con-
front the legal distinctions between unwed fathers and mothers because they
did not have to. Accordingly, these state law cases did not address the rela-
tionship presumed to exist between parents and their children, or that the
illegitimate child was generally suing for legal recognition of the unwed
father-child relationship that the unwed mother-child relationship already
had.83 These cases also largely failed to raise the issue that the children of
unwed fathers in particular were disadvantaged. Instead, they tended to fo-
79 Id. at 771 (quoting Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538). For the initial case that contained the
language exhibiting concern about the lurking problems in paternity determinations, see
Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538. Gomez held that a Texas court could not prevent an illegitimate
child from receiving a judicially enforceable right of support from her natural father. Id.
80 Appellants in Fiallo challenged the law on grounds that it was discriminatory "on
[the] double-barreled bases of sex and illegitimacy founded on archaic and overbroad
stereotypes." Fiallo Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at *54. The Court briefly considered
and dismissed both arguments in tandem. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794. While I argue that the
Court's decision to disregard these arguments is very much linked to its adherence to
plenary power, see discussion infra, Part I.B, its justifications nevertheless reflect the
standard conceptions of unwed fathers and mothers present in the cases of the time.
I See Davis, supra note 28, at 89-97 (discussing the history of the legitimacy litiga-
tion and the various factors leading to a strategic focus on the illegitimate child rather
than the sex-based distinctions between unwed parents).
82 In the citizenship transmission context, Miller likely dissuaded petitioners from
bringing sex-discrimination claims based on the effects on the child; in that case, two of
the Justices believed the child could not raise a gender discrimination claim given that
"the discriminatory impact of the provision [fell] on petitioner's father, Charlie Miller,
who [was] no longer a party to this suit." Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S, 420, 445-46
(1998) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 Louisiana was an anomaly; it excluded the child of an unwed mother from bring-
ing a suit for wrongful death of a mother. Every other state allowed illegitimate children
to sue for a mother's death, but precluded them in differing ways from suing for an unwed
father's death. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (addressing the rela-
tion between an unwed mother and her child); see also Davis, supra note 28, at 95 (citing
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 69-70 n. 44 (1971)).
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cus on the distinctions between classes of children without noting that ille-
gitimacy was nearly always raised, or paternity made problematic, in the
context of an unwed father and his child.84 The posture of the cases pre-
cluded any a discussion about the propriety of sex-based distinctions be-
tween unwed fathers and mothers that remained at the foundation of these
rules.85
The assumptions about the mother's presence and the father's accompa-
nying absence embedded in the structure of the claims brought before the
Court also emerged in its reasons for striking down the state statutes. Despite
not speaking directly to the parental roles, the illegitimacy cases exhibited an
understanding of the respective roles of unwed fathers and mothers consis-
tent with the unwed parents in Fiallo and Stanley. In Levy v. Louisiana, for
instance, the Court held that preventing illegitimate children from being de-
nied recovery upon the death of their mother was a violation of the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection.86 The Court took care to explain that
"the[ ] children, though illegitimate, were dependent on [their mother]; she
cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological
and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that
any dependent would. 87
84 There are only two cases from this period that address a child's relation with an
unwed mother, both from Louisiana. Levy, 391 U.S. 68 (right of illegitimate children of
to inherit from mother); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)
(right of mother of illegitimate child to cause of action for child's death where Louisiana
wrongful death statute barred recovery to parents of illegitimates). In Glona, the sole
concern postulated and quickly dismissed with regard to motherhood was the "conceiv-
abl[e] . . .temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently." 391 U.S. at 76.
" Moreover, the illegitimacy cases were not entirely consistent in holding for the
illegitimate child-in Labine v. Vincent, the Court upheld a statute differentiating be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children in Louisiana by placing a higher burden on
illegitimate children to be able to inherit as within the state's power to make laws for the
distribution of property. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); see Davis, supra note
28, at 96 (noting that while Labine was "ostensibly at odds with the result in Levy, the
Court's reasoning was fully consistent with Levy's analytical approach insofar as both
cases focused exclusively on the impact of the law on children and implicitly accepted
sex-based distinctions between parents in the illegitimacy context").
86 Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. Louisiana was alone in this matter because it was the only
state at the time that did not allow for a suit for wrongful death of a mother by her
illegitimate child; every other state allowed illegitimate children to sue for a mother's
death, but were precluded in differing ways from suing for an unwed father's death. It
was also an anomaly in that it required both fathers and mothers to support their children
born out of wedlock. See Davis, supra note 28, at 94-95 (discussing the persistence of
illegitimacy classifications and the different litigation strategies which have addressed
them); see also Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No.
58), 1967 WL 113865, at *12-13 [hereinafter Levy Appellant Brief] (discussing the
strangeness of the Louisiana death statute and its unreasonableness given that both
mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are legally required to support them).
87 Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. This was also an argument advanced by Appellant's brief:
"Whatever the result with regard to fathers, the argument against recovery is without any
force whatever as to mothers of illegitimate children, with whom, as in this case, they
will usually have a more intimate relationship." Levy Appellant Brief, supra note 86 at
*18.
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In a subsequent case, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,88 the Court fol-
lowed Levy's reasoning, holding that excluding illegitimate children from
sharing equally in the workmen compensation benefits of their deceased fa-
ther violated equal protection.8 9 Conspicuously absent from Weber, however,
was the language regarding the "biological" and "spiritual" connection be-
tween a father and his child that the Court had invoked with respect to a
mother and her child in Levy. Instead, Justice Powell conceded without much
difficulty that "[ilt may perhaps be said that statutory distinctions between
the legitimate and illegitimate reflect closer family relationships in that the
illegitimate is more often not under care in the home of the father nor even
supported by him." ° Thus, the state law cases, while different in outcome,
are not fundamentally at odds with Fiallo's constitutional assumptions about
the respective roles of unwed fathers and mothers.9'
In addition to the domestic problems of proof present in paternity deter-
minations, Fiallo expressed concern with problems of fraud in a foreign
land.9 Placing Trimble closer to home, the Court appeared wary of the
problems that could arise "when [paternity] depends upon events that may
have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier," which it linked to
the "problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent visa applications." 93
A closer analysis provides reasons to be skeptical of the Court's empha-
sis on the foreign in general. For one, such concerns are specific to the un-
wed father who has not legitimated his child. Where a father married the
child's mother or legitimated his child abroad, actions that are equally depen-
dent on procedures in foreign countries, this foreign aspect did not raise
concerns for either the Court or the government. 94 Further, the type of pater-
nity-establishing evidence an unwed father would likely offer in support of
his relation to his citizen child is the same kind of proof required of parents
who are recognized by the statute. 95 Needless to say, the Court exhibited no
concerns with foreign procedures when the unwed American woman trav-
eled abroad; the element of the foreign was only suspect when tied to deter-
88 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
89 Id. at 165.
90 Id. at 173.
91 Although the stirring rhetoric of the state law cases is used spiritedly by the dissent
in Fiallo. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 809, 813, 815 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 n.8 ("[O]ur cases clearly indicate that legislative dis-
tinctions in the immigration area need not be as 'carefully tuned to alternative considera-
tions' as those in the domestic area."') (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772).
93 Id.
9' A child may be legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or
under the law of the father's residence or domicile. INA § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(b)(1)(C) (1976) (current version at INA § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(l)(C)
(2006)). A father may also be wed abroad.
9' See Fiallo Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at *45 (explaining that the proof of
paternity required of a U.S. citizen stepmother to petition for the entry of her U.S. citizen
husband's illegitimate non-citizen child would, functionally, be the same as the proof that
that father would hypothetically furnish to establish paternity himself-but that the stat-
ute, perversely, accepts such proof in the former scenario only).
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minations of paternity, as opposed to maternity. Rather than being worried
about foreignness per se then, the Court's expressed concern is with the
American man in a foreign country and the foreign woman he might
encounter.
96
The government located its concerns with paternity more explicitly on
the act of birth, which became the focal moment given the lack of marital
ties. In Fiallo, the government relied on what can and cannot be seen at that
moment, which confirmed the presence of the mother and the absence of the
father: "Unlike the identity of the mother, which will often appear on the
birth certificate and which frequently can be corroborated by the testimony
of relatives, midwives, or medical personnel, the sole evidence that a man
has fathered a particular child is often the testimony of the mother, and she
may not know."97 Even if the father were to be present during birth, the
government rendered the import of such presence questionable, given the
mother's suggested promiscuity-"she may not know" who is the father of
her child, and "two or more men may claim paternity of the same child."9"
In due course, the Court would recognize a concern based on the perception
that "[tihere are . . . men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed." 99
Although the government portrayed the unwed foreign mother as hav-
ing numerous, even simultaneous, sexual partners such that she may not be
aware of the biological father, these were not the foreign mothers before the
Court in Fiallo, who remained absent from the opinion.'0° The only unwed
foreign mother recognized by the Court and the statute is the mother of an
American citizen or legal permanent resident, hinging her recognition en-
tirely on her status as mother.""° Similar to the cases addressing illegitimacy
of the time, the Fiallo Court considered only one possible set of unmarried
96 In the context of the American military, the government encouraged marriage of
soldiers with the "war brides" of World War II while instituting procedures making it
more difficult to do so during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. See Kristin A. Collins,
Essay, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians' Amicus Brief in Flores-
Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1492-93 (2011) (discussing the race-sali-
ent repercussion of these gender-based laws and the change in military practice post-
WWII to encourage casual sexual relations in lieu of marriage to discourage American
soldiers from marrying their South East Asian girlfriends during the Korean and Vietnam
wars); see also SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLING ALLIANCES: FOREIGN WAR BRIDES AND
AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE TWENiIETH CENTURY 5 (2010) (discussing the category of
"war bride," which established the rights of the foreign wives of American soldiers, but
was denied to many couples in intercultural war marriages, especially African-American
GIs with European wives and white and black GIs with Japanese wives or fiancdes).
91 Fiallo Appellees Brief, supra note 49, at *44-45.
911 d. at *24.
99 Oral Argument at 34:08, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-207 1), avail-
able at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000992071.
"oSee supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797 (noting that the INA was amended to allow for inclu-
sion of the mother-child relationship including "both the illegitimate alien child of a
citizen mother and the alien mother of a citizen born out of wedlock") (internal citations
omitted).
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parents: the present-by-default mother and the absent, unreliably identified,
father. 02
The Fiallo Court addressed neither the illegitimacy nor the sex-based
discrimination arguments that were raised by the appellants, but the founda-
tion for future decisions considering sex-based distinctions was nevertheless
laid. The baseline role for the unwed father in the context of biological pater-
nity was set to be uncertain and potentially non-existent, akin to the baseline
role set for the unwed father in the context of family ties.
B. Plenary Power: Deference over Difference
The Fiallo majority began its analysis of INA section 101(b)(1) by
overtly appealing to the context in which it was made: "At the outset, it is
important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigra-
tion legislation."'' 03 This judicial deference does not, as we have seen, neces-
sarily implicate a "different" jurisprudence addressing unwed fathers and
mothers; it does, however, account for the lack of elaboration provided by
the Court in justifying Congress's decision. In its decision to defer, the Court
rejected repeated requests to treat this matter concerning the family as
unique, or different from a typical immigration case. Instead, the family was
approached like any other entity within immigration law. In so doing, the
Court assumed that the citizen family was like its domestic counterpart, but
under the cover provided by plenary power.
Appellants in Fiallo presented numerous arguments for why the Court
should consider its facts "unique," most of which centered on the subject of
the family.' °4 The family unit-and the ideology of altruism associated with
it-were deployed by appellants to distinguish the case from the Court's
prior immigration-related decisions) 05 Pointing to the different nature of the
claim, appellants argued that their situation did not involve "foreign policy
concerns" or reflect a legislative desire to exclude certain groups "who were
specifically and clearly perceived to pose a grave threat to the national se-
"'o For the purpose of transmitting citizenship to a child within a marriage, there is no
distinction between a foreign father and a foreign mother, or between an American father
and an American mother, given that the rules are gender neutral. INA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a) (1952) (current version at INA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2006)).103 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792.
" See Fiallo Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at *52 (arguing that "[n]o other immi-
gration case has come to this Court with the unique coalescing of factors which exist in
this case").
105 See id. at 19-23, 53-55 (discussing the "fundamental constitutional interests in
family association" and arguing that "none of the prior cases implicated the fundamental
constitutional interests of United States citizens and permanent residents in a-familial
relationship and association in this country with their parents or children or the privileges
or immunities of their citizenship and residency"). Janet Halley describes this notion of
"family," as invoked by the appellants, as an ideology of domestic intimacy. See Janet
Halley, What is Family Law?, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3 (2011) ("In the correspond-
ing ideology, the husband, wife, and child constituted 'the family' and lived in an affec-
tive, sentimental, altruistic, ascriptive, and morally saturated legal and social space.").
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curity." 6 They further argued that Fiallo was atypical as an immigration
case, given that it involved the rights of United States citizens and legal
permanent residents to form familial relationships.0 7 Appellants even
ascribed the family's altruistic associations to congressional motives: "Con-
gress was motivated by a benevolent and generous desire to confer a benefit
on United States citizens and permanent residents."'' 0
Appellants' arguments were unsuccessful. The Court's nearly exclusive
focus on the immigration-related aspects of Fiallo meant that the opinion
discussed neither the particulars of the families before the Court, nor the
family relations the INA was intended to facilitate. Symptomatic of this si-
lence was the majority's refusal to acknowledge the existence or potential
relevance of Stanley despite appellants' insistence, 109 and despite the dissents
by Justice Marshall" ° and the lower court."'
Instead, Justice Powell analogized Fiallo to Kleindienst v. Mandel,"2 an
immigration case that did not involve familial relations and upheld the Attor-
ney General's denial of a visa to Ernest E. Mandel, a self-described "revolu-
tionary Marxist.""' 3 The Court noted that Mandel, a non-resident who was at
the time outside of the United States," 4 did not have a constitutional right of
entry and the First Amendment right of American citizens to hear Mandel
speak at a series of engagements in universities across the United States did
not mandate his admission."5 The Court in Fiallo and Kleindienst cited in
turn to Galvan v. Press,116 a decision upholding the deportation of a once-
member of the Communist party who had lived in the United States for
thirty-six years." 7 Relying on these cases, the Fiallo Court explained its def-
1 Fiallo Appellant Brief, supra note 49, at *53-54.
107 See id. at *30, *53-55 (arguing that the law served to "deny [petitioners] their
constitutionally fundamental interests in familial association and companionship, solely
because of the gender of the parent and the illegitimate status of the child"; and that none
of the prior cases cited by the government involved this combination of constitutionally
protected interests).
108 Id. at *38.
" See id. at *20 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and arguing: "The
invalidity of stereotypes which depict the father of an illegitimate child as having little
interest in and only a superficial relationship with his child and with the child's mother is
confirmed by current social science literature and by the facts of the plaintiffs' cases.").
"' See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 810 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to
Stanley's discussion of the importance of a father's relationship with his child and noting
that "[i]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its... parent when that parent
is male rather than female." (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651)).
1 Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissent-
ing) (urging recognition of the ties between unwed fathers and their children and arguing
that "[c]ourts now recognize that unwed fathers, like unwed mothers, often have strong
ties of affection to their illegitimate children and desire a continuing relationship with
them") [hereinafter Fiallo v. Levi].
112408 U.S. 753 (1972).
113 Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"
4 Id. at 762.
115 Id. at 770.
116 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
"I Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting).
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erence to Congress in matters of "the admission of aliens and their right to
remain" as a necessity, "touching as it does basic aspects of national sover-
eignty, more particularly our foreign relations and the national security."'" 8
The deference required by plenary power therefore negated any sort of spe-
cial, or exceptional, treatment for the family that was at the center of the
challenged provisions.
In likening Fiallo to Kleindienst and Galvan, the Court very conspicu-
ously placed the family distinctly in the realm of the political."19 The mini-
mal acknowledgment that Fiallo did give the family-in discussing the
purpose of the statute-was placed exclusively within "the Nation's sover-
eign power to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived na-
tional interests."'20 Regulating the family, by defining what constituted that
family, was positioned as merely a way of regulating the entry of aliens, in
line with Congress's general power over the entry and removal of, for in-
stance, Communist party members. 121 The family was therefore identified
with the sole purpose of being subsequently normalized as another vehicle of
immigration regulation.
Significantly, the Court noted that the family that was being normalized
within the exceptional realm of immigration included that of the citizen:
"[C]ongressional concern was directed at 'the problem of keeping families
of United States citizens and immigrants united.'" 122 The question of what
constituted the citizen family was subsumed into the larger question of im-
migration regulation. Doing so did not mean changing the family as it was
recognized in domestic law in any substantial way; rather, it meant that the
Court did not have to explain the assumptions it incorporated about that
family, as long as there was a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. The
Court provided not one, but two justifications.
The Court concluded that Congress was allowed to reach such a deci-
sion, even if "it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a
different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to
parents and children who share strong family ties.' 1 23 The decision about the
118 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 (1977). The Court explicitly stated that
"[o]ur cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control." Id. at 792-93 (citations omitted).
19 The Court explicitly cited to both Galvan and Kleindienst as examples of recent
cases where it had not departed from the rule that Congressional power over immigration
limited any judicial review in that area and stated that "[wie are no more inclined to
reconsider this line of cases today than we were five years ago." Id. at 792-93 n.4.10M.d at 795 n.6.
121 Id. Justice Black's dissent in Galvan appealed to petitioner's long residence in the
United States and the family he was a part of: "He has an American wife to whom he has
been married for twenty years, four children all born here, and a stepson who served this
country as a paratrooper." 347 U.S. at 522, 532 (1954). (Black, J., dissenting).
122 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1199-85, at 7 (1957); 1957
U.S.C. C.A.N. 2016, 2020) (emphasis added).
123Id. at 798.
20131
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
strength of family ties was made by proxy; that proxy, based on sex in the
absence of marriage or legitimation, was constitutional both domestically
and abroad insofar as it involved the unwed father. In the domestic context,
that absence formed the frequently unevaluated baseline for the Court's deci-
sions. In the immigration context, the perceived absence of the father's fam-
ily ties with his child and physical relations with the mother were the only
justifications necessary. 124 The principal effect of the Court's immigration
deference was that it enabled the proxy to go unanalyzed, and obscured the
work that the assumptions about the domestic family were doing in the
Court's decisions regarding the citizen family.
II. THE CITIZENSHIP TRANSMISSION CASES: UNWED AMERICAN
FATHERS ABROAD
Over two decades after Fiallo, the Supreme Court again addressed the
INA's treatment of unwed fathers, mothers, and their children born abroad in
Miller v. Albright,125 which resulted in a much-discussed plurality opinion.12 6
The Court considered the same issue a few years later in Nguyen v. INS,
where it held that the imposition of affirmative acts on the unwed father and
not the unwed mother does not violate equal protection;'27 most recently, the
Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, 28 affirmed a decision upholding a
longer residency requirement for unwed fathers in a related provision of the
INA. 29 While Fiallo was decided explicitly within the ambit of immigration
law, Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-Villar considered provisions that address
the transmission of citizenship "at birth."' 30
This Part analyzes Miller and Nguyen alongside the contemporary cases
considering unwed fathers domestically, including Caban v. Mohammed"
and Lehr v. Robertson,3 2 under the rubric provided by the two justifications
first articulated in Fiallo.1'3 It concludes by examining the arguments
24 See id. at 799 ("In any event, it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe
and test the justifications for the legislative decision.").
1- 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
126 See, e.g., Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 2-4 (arguing that Miller represents
a decline in the plenary power doctrine and urging the political branches to use full-
fledged constitutional norms); see also Nikki Ahrenholz, Miller v. Albright: Continuing
to Discriminate on the Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy, 76 DrEv. U. L. REv. 281,
281-82 (1998) (arguing that the plurality applied the incorrect level of equal protection
scrutiny in deciding Miller).
'27 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
128 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).
129 See United States v. Flores-Villar, 537 F.3d 990, 996-98, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008).
131 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 429-33 (1998); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-59;
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 at 993 (each considering INA §§ 390(a), (c), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1409(a)).
131 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
132 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
133 430 U.S. at 799.
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presented in Flores-Villar and evaluating what that case reveals about fa-
thers and mothers in the absence of marital ties. In particular, the arguments
raised in Flores-Villar render explicit the custody determination that under-
lies the transmission of citizenship defined by the INA and sanctioned by the
Court, based on a uniform decision about which parent will remain with the
child.
A. Enduring Justifications and the Rise of "Real" Difference:
Miller and Nguyen
Both Miller and Nguyen involved a challenge to INA Section 309(a)(4),
which requires the unwed father to complete one of three affirmative actions
before he can transmit citizenship to his child born abroad: legitimating his
child under the law of the child's residence or domicile; acknowledging his
paternity under oath; or establishing paternity through adjudication of a
competent court, all before the child reaches the age of eighteen.13 4 The un-
wed mother has no similar requirements. The prerequisites she must satisfy
are possessing American nationality at the time of the child's birth and hav-
ing lived in the United States for a period of one year; the unwed father also
must satisfy equivalent, if not more rigorous, conditions along each of these
dimensions. 35
The Court replaced its cursory deference in Fiallo with a jurisprudence
of "real" difference in its decision to apply strict scrutiny to the distinctions
between the unwed American father and mother. 3 6 While Miller and Nguyen
declined to decide whether the deference applied in Fiallo was mandatory in
this context, 137 the justifications first voiced in Fiallo remained the two inter-
134 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 429-33; Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-60; see also INA
§ 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006). While technically possible that the child or the
mother undertake these requirements, the unwed father still retains a fair amount of con-
trol over that decision. See Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 23 ("As a formal matter,
Section 304(a)(4)(C) does permit a child to seek a paternity adjudication against an un-
willing father .... As a practical matter, however, his decision will virtually always be
definitive.").
131 INA § 309(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2006) (requiring blood relationship with
father); INA § 309(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(b) (2006) (referring to residency requirement for
father in 1401(g), which is being "physically present in the United States ... for a period
or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years"); INA § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006) (conferring automatic
citizenship on the children of United States citizen mothers if the mother had previously
been in the United States continuously for a period of at least one year).
136 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 ("The difference between men and women in relation
to the birth process is a real one ...."); Hendricks, supra note 11, at 450 (arguing that
"[t]he Court's starting point in the unwed father cases was the premise of the real differ-
ence between biological motherhood and biological fatherhood, a premise that is intui-
tively justified even if sometimes exaggerated").
13' In both Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60-61, and Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n.ll, the Court
held that the challenged provisions satisfied heightened scrutiny. The Court in Nguyen
applied heightened scrutiny throughout, and declined to decide whether the deference
explicitly espoused in Fiallo was required. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61 ("[W]e need not
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ests that shaped the Court's reasoning and subsequent outcomes: the per-
ceived absence of family ties transitioned into "the opportunity to develop a
meaningful relationship" between the unwed father and his child,'38 while
the problems of proof specific to paternity determinations still lurked, de-
spite the separate requirement of a blood relationship in INA section
309(a)(1).139
Although the majority's opinion has been criticized as a "stranger to
our precedents,"' 40 Nguyen is very much at home in the Court's domestic
jurisprudence addressing unmarried men and women, as was Miller before
it. Prior to these opinions, the Court considered a series of equal protection
challenges to various state law schemes treating unwed fathers and mothers
differently, including the two seminal family law cases of Caban v. Moham-
med 4 1 and Lehr v. Robertson.42 These cases, among others relied on by the
parties and the Court, 143 are deemed to have settled the constitutional recog-
nition of unwed fathers upon proof of a biological connection in addition to
a verifiable relationship with their child, otherwise known as the "biology
plus" test.144
This Part traces how the dual justifications in the citizenship transmis-
sion cases mirror the "biology plus" requirement of the domestic cases; '4 it
follows with an analysis of the Court's heightened standard of scrutiny,
which requires reasons that Fiallo's deference did not demand, and depends
heavily on the act of birth in defining the real difference between the unwed
parents.
decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates
Congress' immigration and naturalization power.").
138 Miller, 523 U.S. at 440.
'"9 A father will be able to transmit citizenship to his child born out of wedlock if "a
blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence." INA § 309(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2006).
,"Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14' 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
142 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
141 These additional cases are discussed infra at Parts 11.B.1-2.
'44See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Pa-
ternity, 38 ARiz. ST. L.J. 809, 832 (2006) ("The 'biology-plus' cases demonstrate the
legal landscape for unwed fathers in constitutional jurisprudence: biology, on its own,
does not entitle a man to the rights of parentage .... [T]he Court has defined paternity as
something more than biology and appears to have included a functional component in its
analysis.").
"4' Hendricks makes a similar claim about this line of cases that includes Lehr, 463
U.S. at 248, Caban, 441 U.S. at 380, and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), in
proposing that the Court should adopt a model of equality informed by the mother's
gestational period and act of birth. See Hendricks, supra note 11, at 472 (arguing in
support of the "biology plus" criteria that "treats the mother's gestation both as biology
and as analogous to the affirmative acts of parenting required for men to establish paren-
tal rights under the unwed father cases"). In fact, Hendricks criticizes Nguyen for mini-
mizing the importance of the biological difference between men and women. Id.
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1. "Opportunity to Develop a Meaningful Relationship"
The Court in Miller and Nguyen recognized that one of the two central
governmental objectives in placing additional requirements on the unwed
father is to foster the development of a relationship between citizen parent
and child. The particular interest defined by Nguyen was "to ensure that the
child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential
to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by
the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connec-
tion between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States."'' 46
While the Court framed the requirements in gender-neutral terms, INA sec-
tion 309(a)(4), by its own account, applies only to fathers. 147 The state law
cases affirmed a similar statutory structure requiring the unwed father to
prove a relationship with his child before being granted legal recognition, 48
given the Court's acknowledgment of only the possibility that the unwed
father may form one. The perceived absence of family ties continues to de-
fine the unwed father, a necessary precondition to ensuring the opportunity
for developing a relationship.
Enunciated first in Justice Stevens's Miller plurality opinion, the Court
justified the affirmative acts imposed on the unwed father based on the pres-
ence and absence perceived at the moment of birth, an argument that had
been previously raised but not considered.14" Justice Stevens explained that
"[u]nlike the citizen father," the mother "certainly knows of her child's
existence and typically will have custody of the child immediately after the
birth." 50 The father, on the other hand, "due to the normal interval of nine
months between conception and birth ... may not even know that his child
exists, and the child may not know the father's identity."'' Writing for the
majority in Nguyen, Justice Kennedy likened the acts contained in INA sec-
tion 309(a)(4) to the event of birth for the unwed mother--"the opportunity
for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the
very event of birth" while that "same opportunity does not result from the
event of birth, as a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed
146 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-65.
"I INA § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006). In its discussion, the Court in
Nguyen cites to 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
48 See infra of notes 177-202, discussion Caban, 441 U.S. 380, and Lehr, 463 U.S.
248.
149 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (noting "the mother is always present
at birth but [] the father need not be"); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440 (1998)(noting that Congress may have reasonably intended the formal requirements of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a)(4) to ensure fathers the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with
their children that mothers have based on the fact a mother knows of her baby's existence
and often has custody at birth). The government raised an argument based on the event of
birth in Fiallo. See Fiallo Appellees Brief, supra note 49, at *44-45.
11o Miller, 523 U.S. at 440.
151 Id.
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father."' 5 Accordingly, he noted: "[The statute] takes the unremarkable
step of ensuring that such an opportunity, inherent in the event of birth as to
the mother-child relationship, exists between father and child before citizen-
ship is conferred on the latter."15 3
While the opinions treat the event of birth as the central distinguishing
act-a "biological difference" 154 difficult to contest-the Court's justifica-
tion for the different requirements imposed upon unwed mothers and fathers
depends on what occurs after that event. What counts, according to the
Court, is the subsequent relationship-"the real, everyday ties that provide a
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United
States."' 5 As the government argued in Miller, the requirements of INA
Section 309(a)(4) are important because they "provide some assurance that
the father's commitments to the child will be real, not formulaic, and that the
child's ties to his or her citizen parent, and therefore to the United States,
will at least begin to develop during childhood."' 56
In recognizing the real event of birth as legally significant, the "real"
relationship rapidly becomes indistinguishable from its legal recognition.
The government followed this line of reasoning in Miller, arguing that the
"mother has an established legal relationship with her child from the mo-
ment of birth," while for the American father, "there is no such established
legal relationship at birth."'57 The fact of birth quickly assumes legal rele-
vance for both the govemment and the Court, to the exclusion of any other
reality, including the father's potential presence at that moment. Indeed, it is
insufficient that the father may be physically present at birth, or that he be
aware of that birth.' S The premise that matters is the father's legal absence at
birth, which points to his real absence-the absence of family ties-after-
wards. The statute is thus geared toward ensuring that a real relationship
takes place by requiring a legal one: the unwed father must legitimate his
child, acknowledge his child, or have his paternity adjudicated by a court.' 9
The opinions in Miller and Nguyen confirm as much-they are not con-
cerned with the real relationships the unwed fathers may have developed
with their children but with whether the requirements of INA Section
309(a)(4) have been satisfied. The only father recognized by the Court con-
52 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
153 Id. at 66-67.
154 Id. at 64.
151 Id. at 65.
"I Brief for the Respondent at 28, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (No. 96-
1060), 1997 WL 433315, at *28 [hereinafter Miller Brief for the Respondent].
7 ld. at *24-25, *28-29 (relying on the family statute in Texas, where Boulais lived,
establishing legal obligations on unwed mothers and fathers).
158 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the present law,
the statute on its face accords different treatment to a mother who is by nature present at
birth and a father who is by choice present at birth even though those two individuals are
similarly situated with respect to the 'opportunity' for a relationship.").
"I INA § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006).
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tinues to be the married father, whose affirmative act of marriage must be
replicated by other means. Unless there is a legal tie that binds, the Court has
difficulties finding a real one.
The unwed father finds his apex in the itinerant figure of the military
serviceman, whose absence is central to the government's briefs and the
Court's opinions. Charlie Miller, the unwed American father in Miller, was
in the service of the United States Air Force during the time of conception; 60
Joseph Boulais, the unwed American father in Nguyen, was also once a ser-
viceman.' In both cases, military men feature prominently not only in the
facts, but also the reasoning employed by the Court.
In Miller, the government presented its version of the facts as "the
usual scenario" of how U.S. citizen men become dubious fathers: the ac-
count is that of a single "American man, overseas briefly on temporary mili-
tary duty [who] has an affair of unclear origin, duration or substance with
an alien woman."'' 6 The murky origins of the affair colored the govern-
ment's explanation of the ensuing paternity: "Having allegedly fathered a
child who remains with her mother," the government postulated, "he returns
home, developing no parent-child relationship with his putative daughter
during her minority."' 63 While the facts of Miller did involve a serviceman
and a daughter who lived in the Philippines, little else was discussed regard-
ing their relation.' 64
Instead, the Court agreed with the government that the scenario is com-
monplace: "Given the size of the American military establishment that has
been stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century, it is
reasonable to assume that this case is not unusual."' 65 In dissent, Justice
1 0 Miller, 523 U.S. at 425.
161 At the time of Nguyen's conception Boulais was in the employ of a military con-
tractor. Boulais did serve in the United States Army; he was, however, stationed in Ger-
many, not in Vietnam, where he later fathered a child. Brief of Petitioners at 4-5, Nguyen
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1706737, at *4-5 [hereinafter
Nguyen Brief of Petitioners].
162 Miller Brief for the Respondent at *29 n.16. The choice to include the origin, in
addition to the duration or substance of the affair is an interesting one, and functions to
minimize the active participation of the father even at the time of conception.
163 Id.
" Neither the briefs to the Court nor the Court itself elaborated upon the nature or
the extent of the relationship between Charlie Miller and his daughter, Lorelyn Penero
Miller. See Miller Brief for the Respondent, supra note 156 (discussing blood relation-
ship of parties only); Brief of Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union and
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of Petitioners at 2, Miller v. Al-
bright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (No. 96-1060), 1997 WL 327565, at *2 [hereinafter Miller
Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU] (same); Miller, 523 U.S. 420 (noting Miller's physical
absence from the Philippines but failing to discuss whether he had a relationship with his
daughter).
165 Miller, 523 U.S. at 439. Cf Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 666 (1972) ("Stan-
ley depicts himself as a somewhat unusual unwed father, namely, as one who has always
acknowledged and never doubted his fatherhood of these children.") (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Breyer reminded the Court that the statute affects "all Americans who live
or travel abroad," not just military personnel "stationed in the Far East."' 166
The Court continued to rely on the military man in Nguyen, taking care
to note how many servicemen were stationed abroad the year in which Bou-
lais's son, Tuan Anh Nguyen, was born. 67 Boulais himself was not a service-
man at the time, but was working overseas as a private citizen for a military
contractor. 16 The Court was nevertheless explicit in its concerns "with
young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed
Forces in foreign countries."' 6 9 In this context "the [nine]-month interval
between conception and birth" that takes place "overseas and out of wed-
lock," exacerbates the man's inevitable absence. 170 The government also ap-
pealed to the military man's associations with national security, linking the
necessity of the American military presence abroad with the weakness of the
borders at home: "At a time when democracy was under attack throughout
the world and the United States faced grave problems in defending its inter-
ests and citizens abroad, Congress undertook . . . '[to] protect the United
States against adding to its body of citizens persons who would be a poten-
tial liability rather than an asset.' ""'
While the Nguyen Court emphasized the absence of the serviceman fa-
ther, who is presumed to be fighting a foreign war to protect the borders at
home, the Court assumed that the mother could give birth on American
soil-even if serving abroad in the Armed forces. As Justice Stevens noted,
had the citizen parent been "a female member of the Air Force," then
"[INA Section 309J quite probably would have been irrelevant and peti-
tioner would have become a citizen at birth by force of the Constitution
itself."'172 Justice Kennedy later repeated this same point in Nguyen: "[A]
citizen mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to reenter the
United States so the child can be born here and be a 14th Amendment citi-
zen."'173 Even if the father were present, at birth or otherwise, it would be
inconsequential, given that "the unmarried father as a general rule cannot
control where the child will be born."'1 74 The father is removed entirely from
the comparison, as the Court considers the relative situation of different
mothers-"the statute simply ensures equivalence between two expectant
166 Miller, 523 U.S. at 486 (Breyer, J., dissenting).




'71 Brief for the Respondent at 13-14, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-
2071), 2000 WL 1868100, at *13-14 (citation omitted) [hereinafter Nguyen Respondent
Brief].
'
72 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1998).
"7 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61.
174 Id.
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mothers who are citizens abroad if one chooses to reenter for the child's birth
and the other chooses not to return, or does not have the means to do so."'175
The military man and woman are merely their domestic counterparts
who have decided to enlist and are stationed abroad. Indeed, by assuming
the absence of the unwed father and upholding the affirmative requirements
placed on him by the INA, Miller and Nguyen draw upon assumptions from
the various decisions addressing the treatment of unwed fathers in state laws.
In doing so, the Court relied most heavily on Lehr v. Robertson, in which it
held that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
protection" where the father failed to "grasp the opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child." 7 6 Though Lehr is typically understood as dis-
tinct from other domestic unwed father cases decided since Fiallo, all of
these cases preserved similar distinctions between unwed parents.
In particular, Lehr is understood as a departure from Caban v. Moham-
med, 77 a case decided a few years earlier. In Caban, Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, held that a New York State statute allowing an unwed
mother, but not an unwed father, to veto an adoption of their child, violated
equal protection.'78 However, while the outcome in Caban favors the unwed
father,17 9 the Court did little to attack its uniform assumptions concerning
unwed parents, which laid the foundation for its later decision in Lehr.
The Court in Caban does seem to reject rigid presumptions about pa-
rental roles. In analyzing the sex-based distinction, Justice Powell asserted
that "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in impor-
tance."' 180 Leaving aside the question of an unwed father's relation to his
newborn, he explained that "[t]he present case demonstrates that an unwed
father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of
the mother." '' In striking down the statute, the Court recognized different
types of unwed fathers and mothers-the statute failed precisely because it
"excludes some loving fathers from full participation in the decision
whether their children will be adopted and, at the same time, enables some
alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers."'8 2
Yet the Court allowed for the more standard conception of unwed fa-
thers to remain intact, explaining that in "cases where the father never has
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal
Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privi-
175 Id.
176 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
177 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
171 Id. at 382, 388-394.
171 See Chin, supra note 11, at 272-73 (arguing that Caban and Stanley are "egre-
gious cases" that can be distinguished from other unwed fathers cases in that "what was
at stake was the right to have any relationship whatsoever with their children, or when
they satisfied conditions which other parents were not required to meet").
'80 Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 394.
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lege of vetoing the adoption of that child."' 3 Where the father had not
proven that the baseline absence is inapplicable to his particular situation,
the Court may find that unwed fathers and mothers are not similarly situated.
Accordingly, as in Stanley, the unwed father in Caban must still prove that
he is "unusual," in that he has a relationship with his child, to receive the
recognition automatically given the unwed mother. 1' 4
The limits of Caban's paternal acknowledgment seem particularly clear
when analyzed alongside Parham v. Hughes, which was issued the same day
and upheld the denial of a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a child
born to unwed parents. 185 In a plurality opinion, the Court considered a Geor-
gia statute requiring that the unwed father legitimate his child before being
able to sue for wrongful death, while allowing the unwed mother to sue
without taking any affirmative steps.'86 In what the dissent deemed "a star-
tling circularity,"'87 the plurality reasoned that the statute did not classify
based on gender given that fathers and mothers are not similarly situated in
the first instance-mothers cannot legitimate their child, while fathers can-
without questioning the initial difference that required the father, but not the
mother, to do so.' The Court thus effectively replaced the legal fact of
legitimation for any "real" difference between unwed fathers and mothers.
The unwed father's presumptive absence was decisively sealed in the
case of Lehr v. Robertson. 89 The Court held that neither equal protection nor
due process were violated by preventing an unwed father who had not en-
rolled in the "putative father" registry from being notified of his child's
adoption. 90 The Court explained that "the existence or nonexistence of a
substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in
evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child." ''
Again, although the Court framed the relationship in the gender-neutral ter-
minology of "parent and child," the only relevant criterion for the mother
was, by default, the fact that she gave birth to her child; just the father had to
supplement the fact of biology with the establishment of a perceptible rela-
tionship.'92 Relying on the escape valve provided by Caban, the Court noted
that where a father had not come forward to claim a relationship with his
child, the mother and father were not similarly situated. 19
183 Id. at 392.
'" See supra note 68 (discussing Stanley Court's treatment of Peter Stanley as
"unusual").
185 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion).
'
86 Id. at 348-49.
187 Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 356.
189 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
190 Id. at 265, 267-68.
91 Id. at 266-67.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 267-68. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389, 392 (1979) ("In
those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his
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Like the citizenship transmission cases, the extent to which the Court
recognized an unwed father's relationship in the domestic equal protection
cases was in large part dependent on the relationship's legal visibility, that is,
on whether it had been formalized. 94 The Court distinguished the father in
Lehr from the father in Caban because the latter had a sustained custodial
relationship with his child.195 But, while purporting to make this distinction
on the basis of the absence of real ties, the Court in Lehr did so based on the
absence of legal ones. Because the father was not listed in the putative regis-
try and did not satisfy the statutory definition of any of the other categories
of fathers recognized for purposes of receiving notice, 196 the Court refused to
recognize any ties he may have actually had with his child.
The dissent in Lehr raised a set of facts that were nowhere discussed by
the Court-the father, Jonathan Lehr, argued that he had visited Lorraine
Robertson and their daughter Jessica M. in the hospital after birth until Lor-
raine began to conceal her whereabouts from him. 97 He repeatedly at-
tempted to locate Lorraine and his daughter, with varying success until he
decided to hire a private detective, and offered to set up a trust fund for
Jessica, which Lorraine refused. 98 While these facts are contested by Lor-
raine, 199 the Court is satisfied purely by proxy - because the unwed father
did not complete the affirmative steps required by statute, he is not recog-
nized by law. Similarly, in Parham the plurality found no equal protection
violation, despite recognizing that the father "sign[ed] the child's birth cer-
tificate and contribute[d] to his support"; 00 and that his child took his name
child, nothing in the Equal Protection clause precludes the State from withholding from
him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.").
191 Melissa Murray submits that many of the unwed father cases decided by the Court
under state law can be best understood as upholding a preference for the marital family,
or families that approximate the marital family. Melissa Murray, What's So New About
the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 400-12 (2012) (argu-
ing that the series of unwed father cases are better understood as exhibiting a preference
for placing a child in a marital or marital-like family over a non-marital or non-marital-
like family, rather than purely as decisions about the relationship of the parent to the
child). She notes, however, that "[tihough Stanley and Caban vindicate the rights of
fathers who function in the manner of married fathers, the Court is quick to note that the
easiest - and preferred - way to perfect one's paternal rights is to not only act like a
married father, but to actually be married to the child's mother." Id. at 408 n. 115.
"95 Lehr, 462 U.S. at 261.
196 The categories of fathers entitled to receive notice under the law include those
who have been formally recognized as such by legal process, such as any person adjudi-
cated in court to be the child's father or any person recorded on the child's birth certifi-
cate, as well as those who have otherwise been established as the father, for example by
living with the child and holding themselves out to be the father, or where the child's
mother identifies them as the father. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law. §§ 11 1-a(2)(a), (2)(d), (2)(e),
(2)(f).
197 Lehr, 463 at 269-72 (White, J., dissenting).
19I Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
199 Brief for Appellees Robertson at 8 n.2, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)
(No. 81-1756), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 215, at *8 n.2.
20o Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 349 (1979) (plurality opinion).
2013]
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
and was visited by him on a regular basis.210 The absence of the father's
formal legitimation during the child's lifetime resulted in the Court's inabil-
ity to recognize the unwed father's presence after his child's death.202
The desire for a legally recognized relationship can be understood even
more literally as a marriage-like alternative. The Court makes its reasoning
explicit in Quilloin v. Walcott,2° which considered the different veto powers
granted in cases of adoption between fathers, wed and unwed, rather than
between the unwed father and mother.2°4 In order for the unwed father to
acquire the same veto power as a wed father, he must have legitimated his
offspring, either through marriage or recognition.2 5 The brief on behalf of
the unwed father quoted testimony that he "had loved and cared for the
child," had provided him with "food, clothing, and medical care . . . and
sen[t] [his] child to kindergarten and actually [took] him most of the
time. ' 206 The brief continued by asking "[i]n what manner does this factual
situation differ from the cases of many short-lived marriages and di-
vorce?" 207 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, answered by relying on
the fact, or form, of marriage, reasoning that "legal custody of children is, of
course, a central aspect of the marital relationship, and even a father whose
marriage has broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing
of his children during the period of the marriage."2 5
Despite the Court's general reluctance to recognize the unwed father's
actual attempts to form a relationship with his child, the Lehr Court, as in
Miller and Nguyen, nevertheless emphasized the opportunity to do so: "The
significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. '209 The father has a choice "to grasp[ I] that opportunity and...
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship. '210 This is a choice,
however, that the unwed mother does not possess.21' And it is a choice that
201 Id.
202 See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(holding under substantive due process that a presumption that the married father is the
actual father of a child born in wedlock does not violate the rights of the biological father,
despite blood tests that prove the unwed father's paternity and despite holding out his
biological daughter as his own).
203 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
204 Brief for Appellant at 4, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372),
1977 WL 189165, at *5 [hereinafter Quilloin Brief for Appellant].
205 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49.
206 Quilloin Brief for Appellant, supra note 204, at *19.
207 Id.
200 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
2 9 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (analyzing the due process claim).
210 Id.
21' This element of choice is cabined to becoming a father; being a mother is more of
an imperative. See, e.g., Collins, When Fathers' Rights are Mothers' Duties, supra note
11, at 1700 (noting that "[t]he current citizenship regime recognizes that women are
obliged by law to assume responsibility for a nonmarital child, and that fathers have a
choice to assume that legal burden"); see also discussion infra Part III.B.
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carries with it constitutional consequences-if the father "fails to do so, the
Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie. ' 21 2 Nor would the Court find
the unwed parents similarly situated until the unwed father had decided to
grasp that opportunity. 21 3 The necessity for an opportunity only arises from a
deficiency; the unwed fathers in the domestic and citizenship transmission
cases are similar in the assumption that they both begin from a dearth-of
marriage and thus of family ties.
The Court's opinions in the citizenship transmission cases are compara-
ble to its domestic equal protection cases dealing with unwed fathers in an-
other important respect-they address only the American parents. While in
Miller, Justice Stevens acknowledged that INA Section 309 deals with "the
distinction drawn . ..between the child of an alien father and a citizen
mother, on the one hand, and the child of an alien mother and a citizen
father, on the other,"214 the "alien mother" makes few appearances in the
cases. The potentially present foreign mother is nowhere addressed,25 nor is
the mother, foreign or American, who is absent from her child's life, either
by choice or accident. 21 6 The Court only considers the American mother who
will carry her child and take responsibility for its care.217 While the nature of
the equal protection claim focuses the Court's analysis on the American par-
ents, it does not necessitate the exclusion of the other parents involved in the
relationship. The American mother and father are, however, the only rele-
vant actors in both the Court's decisions addressing the domestic family of
state law and the citizen family of federal law.
The absence of the foreign parent in the citizenship transmission cases
addressing the American father and the non-American mother is striking.
This is especially so given the Court's determination that the citizen mother,
unlike the citizen father, will typically retain custody over the child-
"[w]hen a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States, the
citizen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of her child's exis-
tence and typically will have custody of the child immediately after the
birth." 8 Understood in conjunction with the Court's determination that the
American father will likely be absent from birth and the child's life thereaf-
ter, the Court reaches the decision that the foreign mother, like her American
212 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
213 See id. at 265-68 (analyzing the equal protection claim).
214 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998).
215 Petitioner Lorena Penero lived in the Philippines at least until she was twenty-one
years of age, presumably living with her mother, Luz Penero. Id. at 425.
216 Boulais lost contact with his son's biological mother and she never again con-
tacted him. Nguyen Brief of Petitioners, supra note 161, at *5-6.
217 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) ("In the case of a citizen mother and a
child born overseas .... [t]he mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has
an initial point of contact with him.").
218 Miller, 523 U.S. at 438.
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counterpart, will also retain custody over the child. This decision of some
significance is, however, made by implication only.
2. Problems of Proof Still Lurking
The Miller plurality and Nguyen opinion reiterated the concern initially
voiced in Fiallo over proving a blood relationship between father and child,
and the difficulties particular to paternity determinations. The Court contin-
ued to emphasize blood ties as a justification for the post-birth requirements
imposed on fathers, despite a statutory scheme that already requires "clear
and convincing" evidence of a blood relationship between father and
child;" 9 it also remained despite the increased accuracy and prevalence of
paternity testing.220 The Court's insistence on proof of biological ties can be
understood, however, by its adherence to the biology component of the "bi-
ology plus" cases, relying on the unwed father framework it erected domes-
tically in its equal protection jurisprudence.
The Court's concerns with "assuring that a biological parent-child rela-
tionship exists" in the citizenship context continue to center around birth,
relying on the familiar absence of the father and presence of the mother
during that crucial event. 221 Its reasons were again stated in terms of what
can be observed: "The blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately
obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certificates;
the relationship to the unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unre-
corded in any contemporary public record."222 The Court explained that even
if the unwed father were present at birth, "that circumstance is not incontro-
vertible proof of fatherhood" 223 given, as previously noted, the potential pro-
miscuity of the foreign woman, and the otherwise murky origins of the
conception. The Court thus situated the biological difference in the act of
birth, even though what takes place before, at the moment of conception, is
arguably the determinative factor in establishing paternity. 2 4
219 INA § 309(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2006).
220 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 484-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the added
protection is unnecessary in light of inexpensive DNA testing that will prove paternity
with certainty" and that "a different provision of the statute ... already requires proof of
paternity").
221 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62; see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 435-36.
222 Miller, 523 U.S. at 436.
223 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
22 The Court does not recognize this prior event, despite its importance in terms of
biology, and so what takes place during the moment of conception is not directly ad-
dressed. See Weinrib, supra note 4 at 251 (addressing the absence of sex and sexuality in
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence with a focus on Nguyen). Cases involving in
vitro fertilization or surrogacy have proved challenging to the government given the
Court's emphasis on the event of birth. The State Department has, at least in one instance,
found that where the mother has used assisted reproductive technology, the acts of carry-
ing and giving birth to the child does not confer citizenship but rather the "nationality" of
the egg or the sperm, determined by the citizenship of the donor. See Joanna L. Gross-
man, Flag-Waving Gametes: Biology, Not Gestation or Parenting, Determines Whether
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As in Fiallo, the Court relied on the language and reasoning of Trimble
v. Gordon,225 a case about the right of illegitimate children to inherit, which
is also captured in other similar cases of the period, most notably Lalli v.
Lalli.2 26 The plurality in Lalli upheld the constitutionality of a statute deny-
ing a child born to unwed parents the inheritance of his father because he
had failed to obtain proof of paternity during the father's lifetime. 2 7 Its rea-
soning is nearly verbatim to that of Miller and Nguyen: while
"[e]stablishing maternity is seldom difficult," there are "peculiar problems
of proof' involved in questions of paternal inheritance. 228 Elaborating on
those peculiar problems, the Court explained that the birth of the child takes
place in the presence of others, and "'[i]n most cases, the child remains
with the mother and for a time is necessarily reared by her"' whereas
"[p]roof of paternity.., frequently is difficult when the father is not part of
a formal family unit. ' 229 This is especially so where the American mother,
like her foreign counterpart, "may not know who is responsible for her
pregnancy. 23 0
Similar to the fixed eighteen-year cutoff in INA Section 309(a)(4), the
Court in Lalli upheld the exclusion of a child born out of wedlock from
being included as a distributee of his father's estate, on the basis that there
was no judicial decree establishing paternity during the father's lifetime, de-
spite facts that indicated the existence of a parental relationship during the
father's life.' The lack of formal family ties between unwed father and child
trumped any acknowledgment of real physical ties with the mother, or his
child-even in situations where the latter was proven to a 99.98%
certainty. 23
2
Similar to the concerns raised in Fiallo, the problems with proving pa-
ternity domestically were geared toward the issue of fraud more than diffi-
culty. In Parham v. Hughes, the Court recognized the State's "interest in
avoiding fraudulent claims of paternity," and expressed concern that "a de-
fendant may be faced with the possibility of multiple lawsuits by individuals
all claiming to be the father of the deceased child. '233 The absent father
during the life of his child has transformed into a legion of men claiming
Children Born Abroad Acquire Citizenship From U.S. Citizen Parents, VERDICT (April 3,
2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/03/flag-waving-gametes. This decision is argua-
bly in tension with the Court's opinions.22 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
226 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (plurality opinion). Neither Miller nor Nguyen cite directly to
Lalli, which was decided the term after Fiallo.
227 Id. at 274-76.
228 Id. at 267-68.
229 Id. at 269.
230 Id. (quoting In re Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1969) (emphasis in original)).
231 Id. at 262-64 (evidence of the parent-child relationship that was excluded from
consideration included notarized documents where the deceased father referred to appel-
lant as "my son" as well as several affidavits acknowledging relationship openly).
232 See Nguyen Brief of Petitioners, supra note 161, at *7 (noting that DNA test
results indicated to a certainty of 99.98% that Boulais was Nguyen's father).
233 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357 (1979).
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paternity for the purpose of wrongful death suits. The image of the fraudu-
lent and opportunistic father affirmed the Supreme Court of Georgia's rea-
soning in Hughes v. Parham, which postulated that the Georgia General
Assembly may have concluded that the unwed father who failed to legiti-
mate his child "suffers no real loss from the child's wrongful death. 234
These claims of fraud could similarly apply to unwed mothers, given
the separation of the fraudulent act from the biological act. Moreover, as
Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in Nguyen, there is a difference be-
tween the occurrence of an event and proof of that event.235 While it is con-
ceivable that some women may submit a fraudulent birth certificate, that
possibility is entertained neither by the Court nor the present regulatory
scheme. In assessing paternity fraud, the current United States State Depart-
ment's Foreign Affairs Manual allows for the possibility of unconscious and
conscious mistakes by unwed fathers, and provides pointers for determining
when fraud may occur. One of the six guidelines it lists for paternity fraud is
that the child is born out of wedlock.23 6 The very fact of an unwed father is
sufficient to raise suspicions. The fact of being unwed for a mother is not,
however, determinative. Rather, such "[c]ases in which an unmarried U.S.
citizen woman falsely claims a child as her natural child for citizenship pur-
poses are relatively rare but can occur. ' '237
In cases dealing with unwed fathers domestically, the Court's initial
reluctance to allow DNA testing in lieu of some form of legal legitimation 238
waned as it began to recognize the DNA test's ability to resolve problems of
proof in paternity actions. As the Court acknowledged in Pickett v. Brown, a
case involving a Tennessee law that placed a two-year statute of limitations
on paternity legitimation: "[T]he relationship between a statute of limita-
tions and the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent
234 Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ga. 1978) (postulating the different
ends served by the Georgia statute excluding the fathers of illegitimate children from the
benefits of a wrongful death action). The perceived lack of loss upon death mirrors the
assumption of lack of ties during the child's life.
235 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor distinguished
between the requirement that a child and unwed father develop ties before the age of
eighteen and that the proof also be satisfied before the child turns eighteen, noting that "it
is difficult to see how the requirement that proof of such opportunity be obtained before
the child turns 18 substantially furthers the asserted interest" given that "it is entirely
possible that a father and child will have the opportunity to develop a relationship...
without obtaining the proof of the opportunity during the child's minority." Id.
236 7 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1 131.5-3a(1) (2012). Congress has delegated to
the State Department the administration and enforcement of citizenship laws with regards
to individuals who are outside the territory of the United States; the Foreign Affairs Man-
ual sets forth the Department of State's interpretation of the rules regulating citizenship.
See Grossman, supra note 224 (explaining what the Foreign Affairs Manual sets forth in
determining who is a parent for purposes of citizenship transmission).237 Id. at 1131.5-4a.
238 See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98 n.4 (1982) ("We previously have recog-
nized that blood tests are highly probative in proving paternity, but disagree with appel-
lant's contention that their existence negates the State's interest in avoiding the
prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims.") (internal citation omitted).
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paternity claims has become more attenuated as scientific advances in blood
testing have alleviated the problems of proof surrounding paternity ac-
tions. '239 Pickett, however, was decided in the context of an equal protection
challenge based on the rights of children, rather than on the rights of their
unwed parents. 240
In the citizenship transmission cases, the Court declined to allow even
this small inroad of recognition considering the rights of unwed parents; it
paired the problems of proof with a concern about what happens abroad, and
the potential unavailability of genetic testing in foreign countries. 4' The real
anxiety over the influence of the foreign-woman or territory-remained
fastened exclusively to the unwed father, preventing the Court from adopting
even the gradual acceptance of DNA testing allowed by the state cases.
While the Court did not acknowledge the redundancy of the lurking
problems of proof justification where proof of paternity was already required
by "clear and convincing" evidence under INA Section 309(a)(1), the gov-
ernment did gradually eliminate the paternity justification from its argu-
ments. In Miller, the government recognized that the biological connection
demanded by INA Section 309(a)(1) satisfied proof of paternity and con-
ceded that subsection (a)(4) "must therefore reflect, at least in part, some
other congressional concern. 2 42 The government identified that concern as
the development, before the child reached the age of majority, of ties to the
citizen parent and, in turn, to the United States.2 43 The government aban-
doned the biological ties justification entirely in Nguyen. The two interests it
presented were those of ensuring the establishment of a "sufficiently recog-
nized or formal relationship" between the citizen parent and the United
States, and "preventing such children from being stateless." 244 The stateless-
ness justification, which would become the government's central argument
in Flores-Villar, made its first real appearance in the context of INA Section
309(a)(4). 241 The Court, however, remained silent on the issue of stateless-
ness, continuing to rely on its biology-plus justifications in the context of
citizenship.
239 See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 17 (1983) (holding that statute of limitations
imposed on paternity and child support actions violated equal protection).
24 See id. at 17-18.
241 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63-65 (2001) (discussing problems of proof of
paternity in foreign countries where fathers may no longer be present and may not even
be aware of the child's existence); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 437 (1998) (noting
potential unavailability of genetic testing in foreign countries).
242 Miller Brief for the Respondent, supra note 156, at *27.
243 Id. at *28.
214 Nguyen Respondent Brief, supra note 171, at *11.
245 The government argued that it had already raised arguments about statelessness in
Miller. Id. at *11 n.6. However, the statelessnegs justification had only been advanced in
the context of discussing the different residential requirements imposed on men and wo-
men in INA § 309(a) and (c), not in the context of § 309(a)(4). See Miller Brief for
Respondent, supra note 156, at *24, *33-34 (explaining that while the only provision at
issue is INA § 309(a)(4), "[f]or the sake of completeness, however, we shall address the
other features of Section 309 as well").
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3. Heightened Scrutiny: Rise of "Real" Difference
Where plenary power permitted the Court in Fiallo to avoid considering
the family, the heightened scrutiny analysis of the citizenship transmission
cases compelled the Court to directly address the unwed parents before it.
The rise of a jurisprudence of "real" difference, based on the event of birth
and its attendant circumstances, replaced the silence allowed by judicial def-
erence, without fundamentally different results.
Although scholars have criticized the Court's equal protection analysis
in Miller and Nguyen as uncharacteristically weak, it is very much in line
with the Court's gender-based analysis of unwed fathers and mothers in the
domestic context. What has changed with the advent of a jurisprudence of
difference is that, perhaps paradoxically, the continued use of the family as
an entity of citizenship regulation has been increasingly obscured. The site
of the family, however, persists as a means of regulating entry into the na-
tion, and the demarcation of family relations occupies a functional role in the
Court's citizenship transmission decisions.
At a basic level, the shift to heightened scrutiny meant that the unwed
mother and father figures that were avoided in Fiallo had to be directly ad-
dressed. In Nguyen, the Court defined the distinction between the unwed
parents as one based on a "real" difference, located in the event of birth:
"The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a
real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to
address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender." 46 The
difference the Court articulated was not, however, the physical act of birth
itself but the "relation to the birth process. 2 47 The Court simultaneously
relied on a biological distinction-men do not give birth-while locating the
relevant comparison in the parents' post-birth conduct. The Court depended
on the fact of birth only insofar as it is connected to the relations between
parent and child that occur thereafter.
According to the Court, birth must remain part of the equation because
where the mother has no post-birth requirements a direct comparison be-
tween the post-birth conduct of the parents is difficult.24 The Court first set
forth this reasoning in Miller, noting that "it is not merely the sex of the
citizen parent that determines whether the child is a citizen under the terms
of the statute; rather, it is an event creating a legal relationship between
parent and child-the birth itself for citizen mothers, but postbirth [sic] con-
" Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73.
247 Id.
248 For the unwed mother, the only relevant act is the birth itself. See Kif Augustine-
Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA.
J. Ixr'TL L. 93, 111 (2000) (arguing that "[u]nder the law, the children of unmarried U.S.
women embody the U.S. nation at the moment of birth").
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duct for citizen fathers and their offspring."2 49 The Court's statement is tell-
ing in that the event of birth creates not only a child but also a "legal
relationship," collapsing the real difference into a legal one.
The American father and mother exist parallel to each other in Sections
309(a) and (c) of the INA, yet the Court's citizenship transmission cases
bring them together as if they formed the contours of a domestic family.2 0
The Court's decision to directly address the equal protection challenge com-
paring the unwed mother and father places these two figures at the center of
its citizenship opinions. Focusing on the distinctions between the unwed par-
ents, however, conceals the explicitly political question of who is recognized
as an American citizen. The Court has exchanged the deference that enabled
its silence on the reasons for upholding a statute excluding unwed fathers for
discussions of difference that shield the political nature of the decision to
transmit citizenship. That Congress's choice to recognize family relations
impacts the regulation of American citizenship-explicitly acknowledged by
Fiallo in the context of immigration-is obscured by the discussion of do-
mestic-based gender issues.
Although the presence of the military abroad injects some awareness of
the foreign into the Court's opinions, the domestic family remains squarely
at their center. Accordingly, the citizenship-related consequences of how the
INA defines, and the Court decides, the transmission of citizenship, are
unaddressed."' Those consequences may take a variety of forms; the Court's
current decisions fail to consider any possible repercussion. Looking to con-
cerns animating past discussions leads to some fundamental reasons to ques-
tion the Court's silence on the issue. In 1933, for instance, Congress
considered a proposal to amend a precursor to the INA that would have
249 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 443 (1998). This is not meant to imply that the
difference based on birth is not a "real" one, but rather to attempt to pin down and
understand the Court's assignment of difference. Scholars such as Laura Weinrib note the
potential pitfalls of retreating to formal equality in light of this "real" difference between
men and women. See Weinrib, supra note 4, at 230 ("One must be careful, however, not
to conclude too hastily that laws burdening fathers must uniformly be stamped out in the
interest of equality. There is indeed a set of real differences between fathers and mothers
for the purposes of pregnancy law in particular and for family law more generally.").
250 The American family is also the focus, in its domestic form, of the briefs before
the Court in these cases. See, e.g., Brief of the National Women's Law Center et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-12, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No.
99-2071), 2000 WL 1702034, at *9-12 [hereinafter Nguyen Brief of the National Wo-
men's Law Center] (discussing statistics relevant to out-of-wedlock births for fathers and
mothers in the United States); Miller Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU, supra note 164, at
*7 (citing to domestic studies showing fathers to be as competent as mothers in raising
children). But see Nguyen Brief of the National Women's Law Center, supra at * 11 n. 10
(discussing family planning services available abroad).
2-1 Legal scholars have undertaken the project of recuperating the race-based origins
of the sex-based citizenship laws. See Kristin A. Collins, "Illegitimate Half-Castes" and
the Citizen Family: Race, Sex, and the Practice of Citizenship Past and Present (forth-
coming) (on file with the author) (linking the history of thejus sanguinis citizenship laws
to the 1864 case of Guyer v. Smith to support the claim that the sex-based rules were also
deeply race-salient in logic and operation).
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allowed American married mothers to transmit citizenship to their children
on the same terms as married fathers. Congressman Charles Kramer, expres-
sing unease about the composition of the nation, asked Burnita Shelton Mat-
thews, an attorney speaking in support of the amendment, about the effects
of such a change: "Don't you feel," he questioned, "that we are increasing
the probability of bringing in more of the Chinese and Japanese, and 'what
have you', from those nations over there, by reason of this bill?" 252
The plainly racist inquiry is telling in that it reveals an essential element
missing from the Court's current discussions. The question expresses Con-
gress's concerns with how citizenship transmission affects which, and how
many, potential citizens it recognizes; it also discloses underlying prejudices
and preferences that are encoded into that decision. The Court's opinions
evade that question entirely, as they once evaded the direct comparison be-
tween the unwed father and mother. In so doing, possible prejudices remain
unsaid and restrictions unnoticed. Thus, by focusing only on the American
halves of the citizen family, various citizenship-related consequences for
how the family is defined in the first instance, and of the inherently political
nature of such a determination, remain unanalyzed. 253
B. A Move Toward Custody: Flores-Villar
The final equal protection challenge to reach the Court addressed the
differing residency requirements imposed on unwed fathers and mothers
prior to transmitting citizenship to their child. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the differential requirements
placed on each unwed parent. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
was ultimately silent on the question, affirming the judgment in an evenly
split per curiam. 254 Both the Ninth Circuit's opinion and the arguments
presented by the government to the Supreme Court followed the reasoning
set in place from Fiallo to Nguyen.
Nevertheless, Flores-Villar v. United States signaled the potential for a
fundamental shift with the emergence of the foreign woman, the "alien
212 "No; I do not feel that way," replied Matthews. Relating to Naturalization and
Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the United States, And
Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of Nationality: Hearings on
H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 73d
Cong. 37 (1933) (statement of Burnita Shelton Matthews, Attorney, National Woman's
Party).
253 The acknowledgment of the family as a political entity also has repercussions for
the domestic family. Decisions addressing the bounds of family relations and family
membership raise questions about what outcomes are being generated and how. See Janet
Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 290
(2011) ("The division of intellectual labor between Family Law and Poverty Law or
Welfare Law ... obscures the state's constant, conscious use of the family as a private
welfare system.").
'- Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).
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mother. ' 255 For the first time in this line of cases, the existence of the alien
mother was confronted and her role in the statute and the opinions was more
directly set forth in the oral arguments before the Court. The discovery of the
unwed mother beyond her domestic guise, and the relationship she is pre-
sumed to have with her child, present a possible departure from the Court's
strict reliance on unwed parenthood and a move toward the framework pro-
vided by a custody determination.
1. Perceived Absence of Country Ties
Ruben Flores-Villar, the son of an American father and foreign mother,
was denied American citizenship because his father had not satisfied the
residency requirement of INA Section 309(a).256 Complying with the resi-
dency requirement demanded that the unwed father be present in the United
States for ten years, five of which had to take place after his fourteenth
birthday, 257 a physical impossibility for Ruben Trinidad Floresvillar-Sandez
who was sixteen years old when his son, the petitioner, was born.258 Had
Ruben Flores-Villar's mother been the parent with American citizenship, he
would have had American citizenship transmitted to him at birth; the unwed
American mother only had, and continues to have, a one-year continuous
physical presence requirement. 9
While the prior citizenship transmission cases did not directly address
the INA's residency requirement, the Nguyen Court identified the relevant
state interest as ensuring that the citizen parent and child "have some
demonstrated opportunity to develop not just a relationship that is recog-
nized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, every-
day ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in
turn, the United States. ' '260 The Court thus raised the triangular relationship
between parent, child, and territory, but mainly analyzed only one angle-
the opportunity to develop a real relationship between parent and child. The
focus of the residency requirement is on another possible, yet previously
ignored relation-between parent and territory.
The reason for requiring the unwed father to live in the United States
for a longer amount of time than the unwed mother is not obvious. Neither
15s Oral Argument at 40:00, Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011)
(No. 09-5801), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_09_5801
[hereinafter Flores-Villar Oral Argument].
256 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008).
57 INA § 301(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970). The statute has since been
amended and currently reads that the unwed father must be physically present in the
United States for a total of five years, two of which must be after the age of fourteen. INA
§ 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006).
258 Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994.
259 INA § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1970) (current version at INA § 309(c), 8
U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006)).
260 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64-65 (2001).
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the government nor the Ninth Circuit in Flores-Villar provided an account of
how the increased residency requirement for unwed fathers in particular fur-
thers the "connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States. '261 Instead of considering the specific relation between parent
and territory that the statutory requirement directly addresses, the Ninth Cir-
cuit adhered to Nguyen's general tripartite formulation, without explaining
how or where the length of residency potentially figures.2 62
The government similarly avoided connecting residency to parental or
territorial relations. Before the Ninth Circuit, the government argued that the
State's "interest in fostering ties between the foreign-born child and the
United States" was furthered "by ensuring that the father developed signifi-
cant ties with the country at an age of maturity," without explaining how.263
Before the Supreme Court, the government emphasized the importance of
residency requirements and of actual ties to the United States in defining
citizenship in general. 264 Missing from its analysis was a reason why such
ties differed according to gender-why the unwed father needed more time
than the unwed mother to build a connection to the territory of the United
States before being able to transmit that connection to his child.
While the link between father and country is at the forefront of the
residency requirement, the relation between father and child remains in the
background. It is this second, tacit connection that provides the structure in
which the Court can uphold the differential statutory requirements. As the
government disclosed in its oral argument to the Supreme Court: "One of
the important factors Congress has looked at is [the child's] connection to a
U.S. citizen that is in turn a proxy for what likely connection to the United
States will be. 265 The articulation of the relation is not principally between
father and country, but between American citizen and child, in this case,
father and child.2 66 And it is the relationship between father and child that
determines the child's relationship with the United States.
The framework that allows the residency requirement to endure is the
one established and carried forward from Fiallo to Nguyen and Stanley to
261 Id.
262 The extent of the Court's consideration of the relationship between the residency
requirement and the government's stated goal was upholding the requirement because "it
furthers the objective of developing a tie between the child, his or her father, and this
country." Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 997.
263 Brief for Appellee United States at 26-27, United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d
990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2008 WL 1848810, at *14.
264 Brief for the United States at *20-21, Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2312 (2010) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 3392008, at *20-21 [hereinafter Flores-Villar
Brief for the United States].
265 Flores-Villar Oral Argument, supra note 255, at 31:30.
266 The government acknowledged that "the residency requirement is what measures
the connection of the parent to the United States, not the child to the parent," but quickly
transitioned to an argument that "the same point obtains, that at the moment of birth in
another country... the father doesn't have a meaningful connection to the child[.J" Id. at
50:50.
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Lehr-the perceived absence of ties between father and child, and thus the
need for the potential to develop a relationship that would otherwise not
exist. The "real, everyday ties" '67 that matter are those between father and
child, not between father and country. The unwed father's absence and
mother's perennial presence continue to form the interpretative framework
through which the father can be required to be "more" present, and the
mother "less," even in the territory of the United States.
2. Problems of Statelessness
The statelessness justification that the government first advanced in
Miller and then in Nguyen under INA Section 309(a)(4) was finally relevant
to the residency requirement at issue in Flores-Villar.268 The government fo-
cused on this second state interest, which evolved from a concern about
problems of proof with paternity to a concern about the statelessness of chil-
dren born abroad. The Ninth Circuit sustained the validity of the interest
without much difficulty, holding that avoiding stateless children was an im-
portant objective substantially furthered by the chosen means.269
The government relied on the general notion that unwed parents are not
always similarly situated for purposes of equal protection and specifically
that children of unmarried women are at a greater risk of statelessness given
that most jus sanguinis countries recognize only the nationality of the
mother. 20 In contending that the shortened residency requirement for unwed
mothers is constitutional, the government explained that "[t]he difference in
each parent's situation is attributable to what this Court in Nguyen described
as the 'significant difference between the respective relationships of unwed
mothers and unwed fathers to the potential citizen at the time of birth.' 27,
The government therefore linked the possibility of statelessness to the differ-
ent relationships that an unwed mother and father are presumed to have with
their child.
In so doing, it relied on the slippage between the "real" and the "legal"
by reasoning that the real differences based on the act of birth identified in
Nguyen became the legal ones the Court ultimately sanctioned: "Congress's
decision to apply a shorter physical-presence requirement to unwed mothers
was based on the legal reality ... that an unwed mother is established at the
time of her child's birth as the child's legal parent while the unwed father
usually is not. 272 Taking Nguyen as the starting point, the government extra-
267 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 244-245.
269 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).
270 This "state of affairs create[s] a substantial risk that a child born to an unwed
U.S. citizen mother in a country employing jus sanguinis laws would be stateless at birth
unless the mother could pass her citizenship to her child." Flores-Villar Brief for the
United States, supra note 264, at *33.
271 Id. at *32 (internal citation omitted).
272 Id. at *39.
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polated the Court's decisions abroad-that is, "[i]f ... it is permissible for
Congress to apply different rules regarding the conferral of citizenship based
on the different positions an unwed mother and an unwed father occupy with
respect to the child at the time of birth, it is surely within Congress's consti-
tutional authority to take account of the fact that other countries do so as
well." 273
The logic employed is a familiar one. In Parham, the plurality looked to
the reality of the legal difference between unwed parents to affirm the statu-
tory distinctions between unwed fathers and mothers. The "fact" is, the
Court in Parham explained, that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children
are not similarly situated; yet the Court's recognition of this real difference
was based on the legal one that "only a father can by voluntary unilateral
action make an illegitimate child legitimate. 27 4 Thus, the "fact" of birth that
was the starting point for the differences between parents had become a legal
axiom that cannot be assailed.275
Beneath the surface of the statelessness justification remain the lurking
problems of proof with paternity determinations. The government in Flores-
Villar relied on the unwed father paradigm in explaining its particular con-
cern with the unwed mother-"the application of foreign law, combined
with potential problems of proof and paternal inaction, puts the foreign-born
child of an unwed U.S. citizen mother at a significantly greater risk of being
stateless at the time of birth." '276 It does not seem to matter that the twin
problems of proof and paternal inaction are rendered obsolete by the statute's
operation-the residency requirements are triggered only once the unwed
father has satisfied INA Section 309(a), including the affirmative acts of
(a)(4).27 7 Indeed, the government remained silent about the possibility that,
according to Nguyen's reasoning, the unwed mother and father would at this
point be similarly situated.
In its justifications, the government replaced its concern with being un-
able to identify a child's father-fatherlessness-with a concern for being
unable to identify a state for that child-statelessness. Similar considerations
animated both asserted objectives. What disappeared from the government's
173 Id. at *40 (internal citation omitted). The accuracy of the ultimately empirical
assumption that the child of an unwed American woman is more likely to be stateless is
debated at length in the briefs submitted to the Court, and will not be addressed here.
"
4 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979).
275 Justice Ginsburg questions the government based on a similar line of reasoning,
trying to flesh out the difference between facts, opinions, and laws: "you said... this has
nothing to do with stereotypes, this is the way the law was. But wasn't the law shaped
because of the vision of the world of being divided into married couples where the father
is what counted, and . . . the law didn't regard [unwed fathers) as having any kind of
obligation?" Flores-Villar Oral Argument, supra note 255, at 49:55.
276 Flores-Villar Brief for the United States, supra note 264, at *38.
277 INA § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2006) (stating that the provisions of INA
§ 301(g) shall apply only "if' the requirements of INA § 309(a) are satisfied).
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arguments was the Court's recognition of the unwed mother's mobility,2 7
even though such mobility would seem relevant to the question of her child's
potential statelessness and her ability to prevent it.279
3. Silent Scrutiny: The "Alien" Mother
While asserting that it was following the heightened scrutiny of
Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit's pithy statements affirming the interests asserted
by the government were reminiscent of the Supreme Court's reticence in
Fiallo.s0 Its abridged equal protection analysis revealed little about the un-
wed mother and father. The briefs to the Supreme Court were more informa-
tive, and presented the relevant considerations for the purpose of an equal
protection analysis.
Appellant's brief and those of amici focused on a direct comparison
between the unwed mother and father,2"' while the government treated the
unwed mother as exceptional. 2 2 The government thus reverted to the famil-
iar comparison between the unwed mother and all other American parents,
expanding the focal point of the equal protection lens to the pre-Miller and
Nguyen analyses undertaken by the Court.
The most accurate comparison considering the statutory requirements
imposed on parents is a bit more complicated. Under the law as it applied to
Flores-Villar and as it remains today, married parents who are both Ameri-
278 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001) ("[A] citizen mother expecting a child
and living abroad has the right to reenter the United States so the child can be born here
and be a 14th Amendment citizen.").
279 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 34-35, United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d
990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2008 WL 891254, at *34-35 [hereinafter Flores-
Villar Appellant's Opening Brief] ("Furthermore, there is no rational reason to... render
it physically impossible for [the unwed father] to confer citizenship on a child born
abroad and out-of-wedlock, especially when a woman, who has a greater ability to
cho[o]se where a child is born, can confer citizenship on her children.").
280 See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 993 (summarizing holding that even applying inter-
mediate scrutiny, the residency requirements of the INA sections 301(a)(7) and 309
survive).
28' See, e.g., Brief of the National Women's Law Center Brief of the National Wo-
men's Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Flores-Villar, 131 S.
Ct. 2312 (2011) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 2602010, at *7 [hereinafter Flores-Villar Brief
of the National Women's Law Center] (describing how statute facially discriminates on
the basis of gender); Flores-Villar Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 279, at *7 (argu-
ing that the residency requirements in the INA "discriminate against United States citizen
fathers on the basis of both gender and age in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution")
282 See Flores-Villar Brief for the United States, supra note 264, at *22-23 (arguing
that unwed mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with respect to the risk of state-
lessness and that this justified the exceptional treatment given only to unwed mothers in
the form of a lower residency requirement). The title to one of the sections in the govern-
ment's brief is illustrative of this attempt to avoid a direct comparison: "Congress Consti-
tutionally May Apply A Shorter Physical-Presence Requirement To Unmarried U.S.
Citizen Mothers of Foreign-Born Children Than To All Other U.S. Citizen Parents of
Foreign-Born Children." Id. at 22.
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can citizens need only have had one of them reside in the United States, for
no specified period of time, before transmitting citizenship to their child
born abroad." 3 The American citizen of a married couple composed of a
citizen and an American national must have lived in the United States for a
continuous period of at least one year-like the unwed American mother2 4
Meanwhile, the longer residency requirements that are imposed on unwed
American citizen fathers are the same as those imposed on the American
citizen spouse in marriages of mixed nationalities.2"5
Thus, considering the unwed mother in the context of how the statute
treats various parental couplings reveals a slightly different picture than the
one initially presented. The relevant comparison is not between the unwed
American mother and all the other parents, but rather between the unwed
American father and married couples with only one American citizen, and
the unwed American mother and married couples who are composed of one
American citizen and one American national.286
These particular pairings, placing each unwed American parent along-
side different couples, raise the question of what makes each group alike for
purposes of citizenship transmission. One reason the government articulated
in its brief was that in addition to its interest in reducing statelessness, the
State had an interest in the child's American-ness, noting that a child born
abroad to parents of different nationalities "is likely to be more alien than
American in character. '28 7 The government explained that this concern over
an adequate connection to America was what, in 1952, motivated Congress
to add a residency requirement for the unwed mother before transmitting
citizenship to her illegitimate child: "Congress sought to strengthen the as-
surance of a connection to the United States.128 Yet this consideration alone
does not explain why the unwed mother is placed with the group that is
"more" American in character, and the unwed father with the group that is
"less."
Putting aside whether Congress's additional interest in reducing state-
lessness together with ensuring that citizens have a connection to the United
States may account for the differential residency requirements between un-
wed fathers and couples of mixed nationalities on the one hand, and unwed
mothers and married American citizens and American nationals on the other,
283 INA § 301(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (2006).
284 INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006).
285 The government explained the rules more clearly in its brief. Flores Villar Brief
for the United States, supra note 264, at *2-3 (citing INA § 301(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)
(1970)).
286 The term American nationals indicates persons who are not citizens but live in the
outlying possessions of the United States, as distinguished from foreign nationals who are
not citizens and live outside United States' territory entirely.
1
87 Id. at *27 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting To Revise and Codify the Nation-
ality Laws of the United States Into a Comprehensive Nationality Code: Hearings on
H.R. 6127 Superseded by H.R. 9980 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, 76th Cong. 431 (1940)).
288 Id. at *29-30.
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the government raised a third consideration. During oral argument before the
Court, the government characterized Petitioner's argument to be that the un-
wed mother, "as this Court understood in Nguyen, may be the only either
legal parent or the only parent at the moment of birth with the requisite
connection to the child."28 9 From that starting point, the government rea-
soned, "the mother in that circumstance is very much like the two citizen
parent family, the only parents . . . with a connection to the United
States."2 90 The unwed father, however, is not in the same position, given that
at the moment of birth there is "likely to be no recognized father" but "only
the mother."2 9
The government further explained that the unwed father remains dis-
tinct from the unwed mother even where he legitimates his child-"the rea-
son why, is [that] when a child is legitimated, there are two parents who
have the strong connection that was described in this Court's decision in
Nguyen to that child, the U.S. citizen father, but also the mother, the alien
mother in that country. So you have two parents whose interests have to be
taken into account."2 92 In other words, the father who has legitimated his
child is assumed to always be accompanied by the unwed mother who, under
the government's account, will remain with her child, akin to a family of
mixed-nationalities. Meanwhile, the American mother, who under the gov-
ernment's account would remain with her child and unaccompanied, would
be more similar to a family composed only of American citizens and nation-
als. In support of its contention, the government turned to Lehr, noting that
"the cases involving illegitimates that this Court has had in a domestic con-
text . . [are] instructive. '"2 93
The lines spoken by government's counsel directly reveal the foreign
individuals who have heretofore been obscured by an unswerving focus on
the unwed American parents. In so doing, two unmarried mixed status
couples are uncovered-that of the American man and the foreign woman
and the American woman and the foreign man-along with the presumed
interaction between them: what the statute assumes and the Court ratifies is
that the mother, whether American or foreign, will retain custody. The deci-
sion made by Congress and the Court is the same every time, for every
situation in which the parents are unmarried, even where the father may have
legitimated his child-the unwed mother, regardless of the unwed father,
America or foreign, will retain custody over her child. Under this formula-
289 Flores-Villar Oral Argument, supra note 255, at 36:15.
2
1 Id. at 36:31.
291 Id. at 40:15; see also Brief for the Respondent at 17, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1868100, at *17 (noting that the mother's legal right to
custody and control of her illegitimate child was established not only under domestic
laws, but under "the law of most other nations" at the time of the child's birth in that
case).
292 Flores-Villar Oral Argument, supra note 255, at 39:46.
293 Id. at 40:23.
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tion of the rules, an alternative framework of decision-making and analysis
is presented-that of custody law.
III. TOWARD A CUSTODY FRAMEWORK
It is unsurprising that the Court looks to its domestic decisions for di-
rection in cases considering the unwed American father and mother abroad.
It does not, however, follow that the Court must recreate the domestic family
on foreign soil. Despite the Court's nearly exclusive focus on the American
father and mother in its citizenship transmission cases, it is deciding how
each parent interacts in the context of a relationship with their foreign part-
ners and their children. What emerges-most directly in Flores-Villar but
also throughout the Court's prior cases-is that the decisions about how each
parent can transmit citizenship are actually premised on a particular custody
determination embedded in INA Section 309. The provisions of the INA
dictate the transmission of citizenship based on the assumption that the un-
wed mother, whether she be American or foreign, abroad or in the United
States, will retain custody over her child. The Court endorses that custody
determination by affirming these rules and, in so doing, potentially rein-
forces it.
The Court reaches these decisions, however, without ever openly ad-
dressing the question of custody. Rather, it relies on an implicit custody
determination and cites to a line of its own cases that begin from the as-
sumption that the mother, not the father, will retain custody of the child in
the absence of marital ties. This is problematic for a number of reasons.
These unwed father cases are not explicitly decisions about who retains cus-
tody over the child.2 94 As such, these cases lack a framework for addressing
the determination of which parent should retain custody.2 95 They also have
little to say about the foreign mother, and whether she actually will retain
custody over her child.
294 Although each of the unwed father cases can certainly be understood as allocating
custody, they do not openly engage in assessing the parents' relations with their children
and deciding which parent should remain with the child. In Stanley, for instance, in de-
ciding that the unwed father is entitled to a hearing upon the death of the mother, the
Court was essentially deciding that custody could not be removed from him automati-
cally. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (stating that "the dismemberment
of his family" was at stake). Lehr can also be understood as ultimately allocating custody
of the child with the mother insofar as the Court allowed the adoption of Lehr's children
by another man to go forward. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983) (holding that
state law requiring fathers to take specific affirmative steps to receive notice of the im-
pending adoption of their biological children); see also Murray, supra note 194, at
400-12 (discussing a custodial preference for the marital family in the unwed father
cases).
295 It is difficult to clearly delineate the bounds of cases addressing custody law,
given that there is much overlap with other fields, including trusts and estates, juvenile
law, and so on. This Article uses custody law to encompass the various state law schemes
addressing parents' custody over their children at a moment of separation.
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Acknowledging the custody determination that is inherent in these citi-
zenship decisions triggers a set of rules and assumptions different from those
the Court currently relies on. The shift away from the unwed father cases to
a more direct acknowledgment of custody and its analytic framework would
allow the Court to move beyond the circumscribed focus on the unwed fa-
ther and mother and more fully address the relationship between the Ameri-
can parents, their foreign partners, and their child.29 6 Looking to custody
would also impact the substance of the Court's decisions. For, custody law
has considered and mostly abandoned the absolute maternal presumption
that undergirds the rules transmitting citizenship. Finally, this move toward a
custody framework is particularly relevant to the citizenship transmission
cases-the custody decision is not only embedded in the Court's analysis,
but custody-based notions addressing the role of gender in determining who
is a parent are present in the Court's own criticisms and in the parties' at-
tempts to articulate the harm at stake in differentiating between fathers and
mothers as such.
Custody law therefore provides a robust alternative framework not only
to understand but also to critique the Court's citizenship transmission deci-
sions.297 The following considerations regarding the turn toward custody as-
sume the continued relevance of the equal protection analysis generally;
while it is not the only legal approach available, it is important to address
how the doctrine may function in the citizenship transmission context be-
yond a limited adherence to the unwed father cases.298 This Part offers some
preliminary proposals for how conceptualizing the decisions about citizen-
ship in terms of custody may affect the determination of who should be able
296 State laws regulating custody consider all three actors who are addressed by INA
Section 309-the mother, father, and child. See, e.g., V.A.M.S. § 452.375(2) (2012)
(" 'Joint legal custody' means that the parents share the decision-making rights, responsi-
bilities, and authority relating to the health, education and welfare of the child .... ").
297 This proposal stands despite the impact that United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996), may have on the Court's equal protection jurisprudence addressing sex-based
distinctions. While I remain skeptical that Virginia would affect the Court's enduring
equal protection analysis in the unwed parent cases, support for this contention is unnec-
essary-even if Virginia set forth a more searching standard, turning to custody provides
a rubric that is most relevant in the citizenship transmission context. A tangential but
important point is that this turn should not be taken as a necessary indictment of the
biology-plus framework in the domestic context.
29 Some scholars question the efficacy of having equal protection address parental or
familial rights. See Silbaugh, supra note 4 (arguing against the constitutionalization of
family law issues given the Supreme Court's reluctance to address the complexities of
family law, as exemplified by its decision in Miller v. Albright); Collins, When Fathers'
Rights are Mothers' Duties, supra note 11 (questioning the ability of the equal protection
analysis to ferret out discrimination in the context of parental relations, relying on the
circular reasoning espoused in Parham v. Hughes as support). States have, however, in-
corporated equal protection ideals in reforming their custody laws to adhere to gender-
neutral alternatives. See Alexandra Selfridge, Equal Protection and Gender Preference in
Divorce Contests Over Custody, 16 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 168-70 (2007)
(describing states' need for gender-neutral standards for resolving custody disputes and
their ensuing adoption of gender-neutral statutes).
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to transmit citizenship to their children and how it might take place. This
Part concludes by identifying the ways in which custody-related notions are
already present in the Court's dissenting voices and the parties before it, as
well as noting some of the limits inherent in the approach.
A. Some Preliminary Proposals
The Supreme Court has little case law addressing custody, as it is by
and large a product of state law.299 The Court, however, looked to state law
when considering matters related to the family,3°° just as Congress has
looked to the states when fashioning citizenship rules based on family rela-
tions.01 The potential relevance of custody to the decisions addressing citi-
zenship is two-fold: the regulations set out by Congress can be understood as
fashioning rules based on the assumption that the unwed mother will always
retain custody over the child, and the Court can employ lessons learned from
custody about the use of sex-based distinctions in order to assess those as-
sumptions. Having already identified the custody determination that under-
girds the INA as it does the Court's decisions, this section focuses on what
use that recognition may serve. While my proposal centers on the Court's
mode of analysis, the turn toward custody is equally, and vigorously, appli-
cable to Congress, in particular when choosing specific state laws to con-
sider in designing the rules regulating citizenship. 02
At its most obvious, insights from custody law provide an easy critique
to the assumption underlying these decisions, vocalized in Justice Scalia's
query to probe the petitioner's lawyer in Flores-Villar on whether the argu-
299 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domes-
tic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and
not to the laws of the United States."). But see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) (holding state courts may not consider a parent's decision to enter an interracial
marriage and the negative consequences that doing so may have on the child in determin-
ing custody).
300 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000) (observing how state law
schemes take into account the parental relationship in allowing or denying nonparental
visitation).
301 See Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of
Mothers Who Are Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain
Distinctions in the Matters of Nationality: Hearing on H.R. 5849 Before the H. Comm.
On Immigration and Naturalization, 72d Cong. 3-4 (1931) (discussing the laws of the
States in recognizing the fathers of illegitimate children).
102 In revising the transmission of citizenship rules under the INA, Congress could
consider drawing from state laws addressing custody determinations instead of rules reg-
ulating illegitimacy, as it had previously done. The passage of the Child Citizenship Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000)),
granting citizenship automatically to certain foreign-born, biological or adopted children
of American citizens, underscores the real possibility that Congress may consider re-
forming the rules regulating citizenship at birth. See David B. Thronson, Custody and
Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context of
Child Custody, 59 HASTnNGS L.J. 453, 510-11 (2008) (discussing the Child Citizenship
Act's expansion of Congress's recognition of the family in the broader context of how
immigration law functions unintentionally as custody law).
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ment against a stereotype is in fact an argument against a reality: "Do you
say it is not true that if there is a[n] ... illegitimate child, it is much more
likely that the woman will end up caring for it than the father would?" 303 The
question is fundamentally about who retains custody over the child. The an-
swer provided by the Court and Congress is that it will always be the
mother. Recognizing that the citizenship rules are based on an implicit cus-
tody determination identifies the maternal preference embedded in the rules,
as well as in Scalia's question. Employing a custody law framework to ana-
lyze it provides well-trodden reasons for at least questioning the tenacious
adherence to this sex-based model.3°4
Custody law has on the whole eschewed sex-based allocations of paren-
tal responsibilities in favor of a gender-neutral approach to parenting. 305 In
particular, custody law today has rejected sex-based rules that reflect the
conclusion that the woman, as the mother, is the only parent who always
will, or should, have custody over the child. 3°6 This is not to say that because
custody law has abandoned a sex-based framework, so should the Court in
its citizenship decisions. What custody law provides is the imprint of a his-
tory of reforms and the experience of a productive dialogue regarding the
roles of the father and mother figures. This dialogue contains well-developed
arguments on either side of the debate that prove instructive, including pro-
positions that gender-neutral alternatives may not actually lead to the most
equitable outcomes for fathers30 7 or mothers, 308 if custody over the child is
303 Flores-Villar Oral Argument, supra note 255, at 1:07.
34 See, e.g., Sarah Pinkerton, Custodial Rights of California Mothers and Fathers: A
Brief History, 16 J. COMTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 155, 163 (2007) (describing California's
history which came to rest on the gender neutral best interests of the child standard and
generalizing that "California's vacillating journey has paralleled the trek taken by nearly
all other states"). Even scholars who criticize versions of the gender-neutral rules often
still adhere to a gender-neutral formulation. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer & William L. Reyn-
olds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1988) (arguing against
the imposition of court-ordered joint custody and instead in favor of the gender-neutral
primary caretaker presumption).
305 See generally Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child Custody Law Over
the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 451 (2012) (providing an over-
view of the evolution from a system that considered children to be paternal property to
the institution of gender-neutral joint custody, primary caretaker, and best interests of the
child presumptions).
06 See Ariel Ayanna, From Children's Interests to Parental Responsibility:
Degendering Parenthood Through Custodial Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
11-12 (2012) (noting the well-known trend that "[w]ith the rise of formal sex equality
beginning in the 1970s, the 'tender years' presumption and, with it, formal maternal pref-
erence, slowly became obsolete"). See generally Stephen J. Bahr, Jerry D. Howe, Meggin
Morrill Mann & Matthew S. Bhar, Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of
Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1994) (analyzing the effects
of the abolition of the maternal presumption on court decisions awarding custody).
30 See Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges' Accounts of the
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & Soc'y REv. 769, 770 (2004) (noting arguments of
fathers' rights groups who criticize judges for continuing to enforce a maternal presump-
tion despite gender neutrality, as evidenced by the fact that judges award mothers custody
in the majority of cases).
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the desired end. Thus, the central benefit of custody lies not in its substantive
conclusions but in uncovering its presence and incorporating its more
nuanced discussions surrounding gender-neutral alternatives, which have the
further benefit of hindsight given the experience of reforms. 3°9
Regardless of the particularities of the custody decision imported by the
Court, an awareness of the custody determination tout court would expand
the narrow focus of the Court's current jurisprudence to consider the foreign
parents. There is otherwise little occasion to identify and analyze how Con-
gress is defining the interaction between the American parent and his or her
partner. Moreover, given the scrutiny required by equal protection, Con-
gress's seemingly empirical assessment about which parent remains with the
child can, and should, be explicitly addressed by the Court, rather than im-
plicitly affirmed. 10
The move away from the abstracted American family of the opinions
would also allow the focus to fall on who functions as a parent to the child.
The citizenship transmission cases are currently fixed at a level of abstrac-
tion in which the mixed-status parties that are addressed by the statute are
not recognized, and the absent mothers and present fathers before the Court
are ignored. Yet, given that a motivating concern for the requirements in
INA Section 309(a)(4), expressed by both the government and the Court, is
who will remain with the child, custody law facilitates that determination by
looking to a series of considerations captured in any of its gender-neutral
alternatives, including joint custody, the primary caretaker presumption, or
an inquiry into the best interests of the child.3"
Replacing the Court's abstractions with a contextualized inquiry would
flesh out the analysis that it currently assumes. At their core, decisions about
custody are decisions about who can be a parent to the child, in the embed-
ded context of a relationship. In custody determinations, the unwed father is
not absolutely differentiated from the unwed mother-rather, he has re-
... See Susan B. Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind the "Best Interests of the
Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 845, 849-50 (1997) [here-
inafter Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias] (arguing that the vague best-interests-of-the-
child standard leads to subjective judicial decision-making, with the effect of penalizing
single mothers and their children).
309 Diverse opinions pepper the debate throughout family law. Compare Rena K. Ul-
liver, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 107, 130 (1978) (arguing that while "it is disquieting to conclude that the
maternal presumption should be defended and preserved... " it is also the case that "at
this point in history the law should recognize a woman's option to keep the children
whose daily care she has so disproportionately assumed"), with Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d
117, 120 (Utah 1986) ("[T]he tender years doctrine was perhaps useful in a society in
which fathers traditionally worked outside the home and mothers did not; however, since
that pattern is no longer prevalent . . . the tender years doctrine is equally
anachronistic.").
3'0 The form of this argument would follow those made with respect to statelessness
in Flores-Villar. See generally Flores-Villar Brief for the United States, supra note 264.
3" These proposals would likely still be subject to an age cut-off in determining
whether citizenship was transmitted at birth.
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ceived both recognition and custody over his child.31 2 A study published a
few years prior to Nguyen already noted the substantial numbers of unwed
fathers gaining custody over their children in court disputes. 3 These deci-
sions provide a strong counterpoint to the recurring custody determination
that the rules and the Court assume in the citizenship transmission context.
Significantly, the turn to custody would also direct the emphasis away from
the "unweddedness" of the parents, as once was the case with the "illegiti-
macy" of the child, the legal marker the Court presently relies on in place of
the actual ties shared by the parent and child.3 14 Such a development is espe-
cially timely given the steady rise of children born to parents who are not
married.
Addressing the custody determination embedded in these rules also em-
phasizes the mutability of the Court's initial allocation and raises the ques-
tion of how custody itself is affected by the automatic grant of citizenship
via the American mother or father. Allowing a parent to transmit citizenship
automatically to their child may be a factor in the decision regarding which
parent remains with the child in the first place.3"5 This would mean that the
INA's automatic allocation of custody facilitates the unwed mother's reten-
tion of custody, and does not just endorse a static, a priori custody decision.
The question of which parent retains custody must be considered in
conjunction with how citizenship is transmitted in order to assess the effect
both may have on the three relevant actors. For instance, granting the unwed
American father the ability to transmit citizenship automatically, based on
DNA testing or on some other proof of parentage, may in turn facilitate his
ability to retain custody over his child. The father's ability to transmit citi-
312 See, e.g., Ragghanti v. Reyes, 123 Cal. App. 4th 989 (2004) (affirming trial court's
order of custody to unmarried father when the mother sought to move away, on the basis
of the child's best interests).
313 See Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Iowa 2002) (holding that a statute
preventing the child of an unmarried father from receiving child support for postsecon-
dary education when a child whose parents were divorced would have been entitled to
such a subsidy, did not violate equal protection); Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are
Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody
Disputes-1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q. 215, 230-31 (1997) (noting that
"[i]n the twenty years following [Stanley], unwed fathers have made appreciable strides
toward achieving equal footing with that of unmarried mothers in securing custody of
their children" and that "a substantial number of unmarried fathers [are] seeking court-
ordered awards and winning"). This is not to imply that unwed fathers are always recog-
nized in custody determinations on equal terms as divorced fathers, but more so than in
the strictly unwed father context. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); see
also, supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 185-13 and accompanying text.
315 There may of course be variations of how this could play out as an empirical
matter, and many variables would have to be accounted for, including whether there is an
awareness on behalf of the parents of the potential to transmit citizenship. For the purpose
of this discussion it is sufficient to note that it raises a question to be further developed.
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-52 (1979) (proposing an alternative framework
for understanding the role of the law by considering the effects of the legal system on
private relations outside of the courtroom).
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zenship automatically may then turn out to actually be harmful to the unwed
mother by creating an uneven power dynamic between the American father
and the foreign mother, but may be desirable for their child; these different
possible schemes are accompanied by varying degrees of normative desira-
bility, which depend on the perspective of each actor.3 16 Decoupling the
transmission of citizenship from the decision of who retains custody is there-
fore important to understand the potential consequences each decision may
have on the different actors.
These are merely some introductory observations of the ways in which
the recognition of custody, on its own terms, may impact the Court's analysis
or Congress's amendments; they require further research and development." 7
It is worth emphasizing that the move to sex-neutrality in custody determina-
tions has not been without its detractors. On the contrary, there have been
many, and varied, criticisms, ranging from whether the different gender-neu-
tral standards are actually sex-neutral in practice,"' to whether they are ef-
fective in advancing sex equality. 3 9 These criticisms do not eliminate the
relevance of the custody framework. Rather, they merely complicate the dis-
cussions surrounding the role of sex in deciding custody in the citizenship
transmission context.
At the very least, looking to the developments in custody law provides
a familiar point of comparison. The rules of custody law reflect an under-
standing, in theory if not in reality, that the mother, unwed or divorced, is
not always presumed to be the parent with whom the child will, or should,
live. This rather uncontroversial realization is one that the rules regulating
citizenship, and the decisions affirming them, have yet to consider.
B. Custody as Critique
The alternative framework custody law provides is especially appealing
for yet another reason-it is already implicit in the arguments raised by the
parties and in the Court's dissenting voices. In developing the harm at stake
316 See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 4, at 247-48, 271-72 (considering the potential
benefits and pitfalls of allowing citizenship to transmit automatically from unwed father
to child in the context of Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)).
317 One concern, for instance, is that the custody framework is based on an adver-
sarial model as questions typically arise in moments of separation. This may not always
be true of the citizenship cases before the Court.
318 See, e.g., Artis, supra note 307, at 771 (finding that gender preferences factor into
judges' gender neutral custody determinations); Jacobs, supra note 308 (arguing that best
interests of the child is a vague standard allowing for judicial subjectivity and gender
bias, but also noting that other gender neutral alternatives are no better in promoting
equality).
319 See Martha L. Fineman, Custody Determination at Divorce: The Limits of Social
Science Research and the Fallacy of the Liberal Ideology of Equality, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN
& L. 88, 91 (1989) (arguing that a "gender-neutral framework" in custody determina-
tions "masks real inequalities between women and men" given that it is "applied in a
gendered world to gendered lives").
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in the citizenship cases, the parties before the Court rely on an articulation of
the harm that has been recognized by courts deciding questions involving
custody-that of the limited roles assigned to fathers and mothers. 20 The
parties use custody in a more substantive way as well: the harm in the citi-
zenship transmission cases has been defined as the inability of fathers and
mothers to retain custody over their child.3 21 Much of the criticism leveled
by the Court itself also relies on concepts adopted directly from custody, as
seen in the Justices' use of certain gender-neutral parenting terms. Thus, cus-
tody provides the parties and the Court with both a concrete harm, and a
language to articulate the harm that accrues in deciding who is a parent
based purely on sex.
In defining the harm initially, parties contesting the sex-based laws in
the immigration and citizenship cases exhibited a concern with the limited
recognition granted the father, and the repercussions on the mother's ability
to remain with and care for her child. The discrimination-based arguments
raised in Fiallo recognized the harm to the father as "rest[ing] upon archaic
and overbroad stereotypes concerning the character of unwed fathers and
their relationship to their illegitimate children. 3 22 The harm to the mother in
these rules not recognizing the unwed father was characterized as the in-
creased difficulty of being a mother and the potential damage to her ability
to care for her children.3 23
By the time of Miller and Nguyen, the parties' arguments understood
the law's treatment of unwed fathers and mothers as problematic because it
reinforced rigid gender roles along both axes. One of the harms of the INA,
as articulated by amicus in Miller, was that the statute was rooted in the
notion "that the American father is never anything more than the proverbial
breadwinner who remains aloof from day-to-day childrearing duties" while
the American mother "has a natural and primary function of caring for the
children and the home, so that no further proof of her connection to her
320 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 692-93 (Iowa 2007)
("While some families function along traditional lines with a primary breadwinner and
primary caregiver, other families employ a more undifferentiated role for spouses or even
reverse 'traditional' roles. A one-size-fits-all approach in which joint physical care is
universally disfavored is thus subject to serious question given current social realities.").
321 See Miller Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU, supra note 164, at *11-12.
322 Brief for the Appellants at 24-25, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (No. 75-
6297), 1976 WL 181344, at *24-25.
323 Id. at *24 n.17. A similar argument appeared in Trimble, where appellants asserted
that the Illinois law prohibiting the illegitimate child from inheriting from his father dis-
criminated against the surviving mother. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977)
(concluding that the statute is unconstitutional because it discriminates against illegiti-
mate children and declining to reach the sex discrimination argument). The concern was
that "[t]he child's mother, his sole surviving parent .... has the onerous task of support-
ing a child who has no claim against his father's estate," which in turn "will burden or
frustrate the mother in obtaining, retaining, or exercising the custody and care of the
child." Brief of the Appellants at 57, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (No. 75-
5952), 1976 WL 181301, at *57.
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children is necessary. '32 4 Petitioners in Nguyen followed similar reasoning,
arguing that INA Section 309(a)(4) depended on overbroad generalizations
regarding men and women, with dire consequences for families who did not
follow the familiar roles-Nguyen itself "clearly underscores the danger...
of permitting sex-based stereotypes to define legal rights. 325
These arguments exhibited a further understanding that the heightened
role required of mothers and the lesser role required of fathers made it more
difficult for each unwed partner to parent. The harm was thus understood as
the prevention of men and women from functioning as fathers and mothers.
Indeed, amicus in Miller defined the harm at stake as the interference with
the natural parents' ability to retain custody over their children: "The stereo-
type on which [INA Section 309] is based-the image of the mother as
connected by nature to her children while fathers are not-is harmful to both
mothers and fathers in many areas, particularly in custody
determinations." 326
The various opinions in the citizenship transmission cases demonstrated
little consensus between the majorities, pluralities, and dissents about when
the law's different treatment of unwed fathers and mothers was harmful, and
to whom such harm accrued. Characterizing INA Section 309(a)(4) in
Miller, Justice Stevens asserted that the statute actually favored the father
and disadvantaged the mother. Reasoning that the requirements imposed by
INA Section 309(a)(4) were minimal compared with the requirements im-
posed by the decision to carry and birth the child, Justice Stevens concluded
"[i]t seems obvious that the burdens imposed on the female citizen are more
severe than those imposed on the male citizen. '327 Justice Kennedy echoed
such observations in Nguyen, noting that while the mother's requirement was
satisfied at the moment of birth, the unwed father or his child had the benefit
of eighteen years to satisfy the demands of INA Section 309(a)(4).3 28
Dissents in both cases reflected an understanding of the harm more akin
to the arguments presented by appellants before them. In Miller, Justice
Breyer defined the harm in terms contradictory to the plurality, arguing that
the statute made it more difficult for the unwed father to transmit citizenship
to his children born abroad.329 The effect, Justice Breyer argued, was to deny
recognition to the different familial roles undertaken by both mothers and
fathers-"either men or women may be caretakers... either men or women
may be 'breadwinners.' "330 In Nguyen, Justice O'Connor broke away from
the standard definition of the injury by raising a point that had previously
324 Miller Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU, supra note 164, at *8. But see Silbaugh,
supra note 4, at 1155 (criticizing the ACLU's brief in Miller for "speak[ing] of the roles
of fathers and mothers in an almost cartoonish way").
325 Nguyen Brief of Petitioners, supra note 161, at *15.
326 Miller Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU, supra note 164, at *11.
327 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 (1998).
328 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61-62 (2001).
329 Miller, 523 U.S. at 481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).330 d. at 488.
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only been implied-namely, that taking care of a child born out of wedlock
was a burden, not a benefit that falls on the woman but escapes the man."'
Justice O'Connor characterized INA Section 309(a)(4) as a law that the
mother is "'bound' to serve": "'when it comes to the illegitimate child,
which is a great burden, then the mother is the only recognized parent, and
the father is put safely in the background.' ",332 Thus, Justice O'Connor de-
fined the harm not as being to motherhood, but stemmingfrom motherhood.
The desirability of retaining custody was no longer understood as an unques-
tioned good, but demanded a different normative assessment. 33
In presenting alternative proposals, Justices Breyer and O'Connor ad-
vanced criticisms informed in particular by custody law. Instead of sex, Jus-
tice Breyer offered the categories of "Caretaker" and "Noncaretaker
Parents" in order to satisfy Congress's ends and also avoid equating sex with
caretaking.334 His criticism of the Court's endorsement of a sex-based re-
quirement when a gender-neutral one would satisfy the government's as-
serted aims stems directly from developments in custody law recognized
well over a decade prior to Miller-"we hold today that there is a presump-
tion in favor of the primary caretaker parent, if he or she meets the mini-
mum, objective standard for being a fit parent .. .regardless of sex. 335
Justice Breyer's appeal to recognize a parent on the basis of a caretaker stan-
dard instead of on the basis of sex succeeded the evolution of a sex-neutral
rule in decisions concerning who should retain custody over a child in the
event of a divorce or separation.3 36 The parties in Miller relied on custody
law to articulate the harm produced by sex-based distinctions in the parental
' Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332 Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Relating to Naturalization and Citi-
zenship Status of Certain Children of Mothers Who Are Citizens of the United States, and
Relating to the Removal of Certain Distinctions in the Matters of Nationality: Hearing on
H.R. 5849 Before the H. Comm. On Immigration and Naturalization, 72d Cong. 3
(1931)).
13 See Collins, When Fathers' Rights are Mothers' Duties, supra note 11, at
1682-1703 (arguing that history of coverture explains the allocation of parental responsi-
bilities in INA Section 309, allowing men to remain sexually active without the bearing
the consequences of children born as a result). Arguably, Justices Kennedy and Stevens
share a similar view, given their position that the unwed father's requirements are less
onerous than the unwed mother's. See supra notes 327-28.
... Miller, 523 U.S. at 487 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135 Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J.); see also Rich-
ard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing in favor of the sex-neutral,
primary caretaker presumption in custody decisions). But see Selfridge, supra note 298,
at 173 n.31 (arguing that the primary caretaker presumption generally, and for Judge
Neely particularly, functions as a thinly-veiled proxy for granting custody to the mother).336 See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision
Making about Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 845, 917-19 (2002)
(describing the rise of the gender-neutral primary caretaker presumption and how it is
currently one factor to consider in the more dominant best interests of the child analysis);
see also Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Care-
taker As Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 537-42 (1987) (noting that while its justifica-
tions are genuinely gender-neutral the primary caretaker presumption may be critiqued by
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context; 37 Justice Breyer's appeal to custody law aimed to recognize that
both fathers and mothers, even if unwed, may be caretakers of their children.
While Justice Breyer acknowledged the ability of both partners to par-
ent, Justice O'Connor focused on the choice not to parent, also by relying on
the framework provided by custody. In arguing that INA Section 309(a)(4)
reflected outdated stereotypes of mothers and fathers, Justice O'Connor
turned directly to domestic custody laws, observing that "our States' child
custody and support laws no longer assume that mothers alone are 'bound' to
serve as 'natural guardians' of nonmarital children. '338 As proof, Justice
O'Connor cited to statutes addressing these areas-an Arizona statute estab-
lishing equal duties of support for mothers and fathers339 and a California
rule abolishing the tender years presumption in custody decisions.34 That is,
the framework Justice O'Connor relied on to challenge the majority's sex-
based assumptions was one that developed by addressing mothers, fathers
and their children in the context of a custody determination.3 41
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's suggestion that motherhood itself can be
a burden is also a possibility that could be acknowledged by a custody deter-
mination. Basing the citizenship transmission cases on a custody framework
would more easily take the decision not to parent, by both sexes, into ac-
count. In particular, bringing the two parents into the analysis required by
custody would recognize that there may be an element of choice in the deci-
sion of whether to be a mother, not only a father, that is mostly absent from
the unwed parent cases. 342
Far from being a monolithic entity, family law provides different mod-
els of parenting that Congress and the Court can consider in fashioning rules
based on family relations. Accepting that the principal aim is to eradicate
sex-based inequalities, questions must be asked regarding which custody
rule should be adopted in the citizenship context either by the Court or Con-
gress and what it should look like. Should it be modeled on joint custody or
some as a maternal presumption in disguise given that it is a role usually filled by
women).
31 Miller Brief of Amici Curiae the ACLU, supra note 164, at *9-10 (discussing the
various negative effects that sex-based distinctions have been reported to have in custody
determinations for both men and women).
338 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 92 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).339 Az. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-501 (1999) ("every person has the duty to provide all
reasonable support for that person's natural and adopted minor, unemancipated
children").
3 0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600 (West 1972)) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 3020
(West 2000)).
34 This framework was adopted also by the amici in this case. See Nguyen Brief of
the National Women's Law Center, supra note 250, at *19 (relying on a series of state
statutes addressing support of children, some decided in the context of custody and disso-
lution of a marriage, to support its contention that gender-based distinctions have been
abandoned).
12 The limited discussion of maternal choice recognized by the Court in the citizen-
ship transmission context is the choice to abort. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433(1998) ("If the citizen mother is an unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the
pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortionl.]").
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the primary caretaker presumption? Would it require affirmative steps on
behalf of both the mother and the father or render the transmission of citi-
zenship automatic for both parents? In striving for equality, should the Court
or Congress equalize up or down?
This focus on the respective roles of the parents in designing rules regu-
lating citizenship is, ultimately, limited. Looking only to the rules' impact on
gender does not provide a complete proposal for reform, as numerous con-
structions could feasibly render the mother and father "equal." The impor-
tance of sex and parental roles inevitably comes up against the question of
what citizenship or immigration policy Congress chooses to institute. The
issue is not only, or most immediately, about which direction sex equality
should take. Rather, it is also about which, and how many, United States
citizens Congress decides to recognize.343 Looking to custody provides a
starting point-it introduces the child to whom citizenship may accrue into
the analysis and identifies the conditional nature of the relationship between
the determination of who receives citizenship and who retains custody. It
also forces the analysis into the next step, which is to more explicitly unite
the considerations of sex with politics in deciding how citizenship should be
transmitted.
CONCLUSION
The deep-seated similarities present throughout the Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence addressing unwed fathers have been largely over-
looked. The decisions beginning with Fiallo and ending in Flores-Villar are
most completely understood as the product of a larger legal structure that
treats mothers one way and fathers another. Yet the unwed father cases are
rarely considered in tandem, spanning fields as diverse as family law, trusts
and estates law, and immigration and nationality law. Bringing these seem-
ingly discrete decisions together into a larger whole unifies an otherwise
disjointed thread and reveals the law's role in shaping our conception of
unwed parents and their children.
The Court's citizenship transmission decisions are part and parcel of its
jurisprudence addressing fathers and mothers who are unwed-the unwed
father exists dubiously in the absence of a legal relation, while the unwed
"I The question of what remedy is available were the Court to find that the INA was
a violation of equal protection raises similar issues. The Justices' discussion here switches
from gender to politics, disagreeing as to whether it is within their power to rule on a
remedy. In Nguyen, Justice O'Connor suggested that severance of the provision address-
ing men would be the appropriate course of action. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 94-97
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In contrast, in Miller, Scalia hesitated to find any role for
courts in expanding or limiting the statute as it would entail conferring or denying citi-
zenship. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 457-59 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
know of no instance, however, in which this Court has severed an unconstitutional re-
striction upon the grant of immigration or citizenship. It is in my view incompatible with
the plenary power of Congress over those fields .... ").
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mother exists certainly given the biological fact of birth. Uncovering the
way men and women are treated in their roles as unwed fathers and mothers
is crucial to the formulation of any relevant proposal for reform. It is particu-
larly important where, as here, a certain set of decisions is understood to be
"exceptional"; describing as different what is actually the same is deeply
troubling, all the more invidious because it remains invisible.
An analysis of the citizenship transmission cases alongside the Court's
domestic cases provides glimpses into the source of its reasons for continu-
ing to uphold sex-based distinctions. An especially salient strand that
emerges is the Court's conception of, and reliance on, the fact of birth. The
extent to which the fact of birth does work in the citizenship transmission
cases becomes clear as they proceed; the attenuated relation between the act
of birth and the status of citizenship is, once exposed, rather easy to grasp.
Indeed, the event of birth has justified decisions about who is an American
citizen and how long a parent must live in the territory of the United States,
depending on whether that parent is a man or a woman.
This particular difference is more difficult to see when it does work in
the "natural" 344 context of unwed mothers and fathers. Understanding its
role within the citizenship transmission cases raises reasons to be wary of
the work it is doing in the context of unwed mothers and fathers writ large.
The fact that women as a class have the potential to give birth will arguably
always be present in such comparisons. Yet the progression of these unwed
father cases reveals the various ways in which "real" biological differences
become legal ones that perpetuate the entrenchment of a discourse of differ-
ence. In these cases, the real difference of the act of birth has prevented
unwed fathers and mothers from being similarly situated for the legal pur-
pose of transmitting citizenship. The line between the legal and the real, as
between the act of birth and the creation of an ensuing relationship, is per-
ceptibly porous.3 45 For this reason, we should question the Court's reliance
on the real biological difference of the "event of birth" as the basis for its
comparisons between men and women;3 46 the link between these real differ-
ences and the legal distinctions they are used to justify must be carefully
scrutinized.
This Article has analyzed the differences between men and women as
fathers and mothers. The questions raised herein have, however, wider appli-
14 See Spence v. Durham, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (N.C. 1973) ("It is universally recog-
nized that the mother is the natural custodian of her young . . .[O]ther things being
equal, the mother should be given their custody, in order that the children may not only
receive her attention, care, supervision, and kindly advice, but also may have the advan-
tage and benefit of a mother's love and devotion for which there is no substitute ... )
(quoting 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §15.09 at 226-29 (2d ed. 1961)).
145 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (". . . the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth.")
346 See discussion supra, note at 272-304; see also Dan Slater, Op-Ed., Darwin Was
Wrong About Dating, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2013, at SRI (describing the difference be-
tween the evolution of biology and the evolution of the culture surrounding that biology).
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cability. Not only are births to unwed parents increasing, but so are births
with the use of assisted reproductive technology. While heterosexual part-
ners are the most common users of the technology, same-sex couples are
included in this demographic.3 47 Cases in which a biological link may be
partly or entirely absent between the intended parent and child test the limits
of using birth, at times decoupled from biology, in defining who is an Amer-
ican citizen.3 48
The backdrop of difference based on sex also obscures the racial com-
ponent associated with births to unwed parents domestically,3 49 and the race-
based restrictions that once explicitly defined who could be a citizen.350 De-
cisions about how to define the bounds of illegitimacy and who to allow into
the borders of the United States have a deeply racist history. The emphasis,
by the parties and the Court, on unwed American mothers and fathers func-
tions to marginalize the racially exclusive nature of the decisions that always
recognize the children of mothers, but only sometimes those of fathers.3 '
Accordingly, little attention is paid by the Court or the parties before it to the
question of how Congress decides to confer citizenship-rather than define
difference-or how the rules in place affect the number of American citizens
who are bom abroad-rather than which unmarried parent they disadvan-
tage, or benefit.
What was clear in Fiallo that has been lost in the cases focusing on the
American parents is how the family functions as one of the many entities
347 See Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma'am, Your Baby Is An Alien: Outdated Immigration
Rules and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 115-16(2010) (noting that while the majority of couples using assisted reproductive technologies
(ART) are of different sexes, immigration and nationality rules regulating ART will dis-
proportionately affect same-sex couples whose options for creating a family include, sig-
nificantly, ART).
348 Id.; see supra note 224 (explaining the unintended consequences of the State De-
partment's regulation allowing a child born through ART or a surrogate to acquire citizen-
ship only if sperm or egg is a U.S. citizen); see also 7 FAM 1131.4-2 (recognizing child if
citizen mother and/or citizen father provided either egg and/or sperm).
349 See Murray, supra note 194, at 413-16, 425-26 (analyzing the costs of coupling
the stigma of illegitimacy with same-sex marriage advocacy efforts, emphasizing the im-
portance of recuperating the racial component of out of wedlock births and their associa-
tion with young, single, African American mothers).350 See generally CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WO-
MEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 22-35, 135-36 (1998) (addressing the
interplay between race and citizenship through marriage and the various ways that mar-
riage interacted with men or women unable to naturalize due to their race); MAE N. NGAI,
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004)
(examining the history of race and national origins quota in immigration law and the
construction of the illegal alien); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American
History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 (2005)(analyzing how gender and race intersected in U.S. immigration laws historically to bar
Asian women and men from access to citizenship).
31' See Collins, "Illegitimate Half-Castes" and the Citizen Family, supra note 251
(discussing the race-salient origins of personal status laws governing citizenship in a gen-
der asymmetrical fashion).
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Congress deploys in the realm of immigration and citizenship legislation. 5
Recovering the use of the family as a site of regulation is important in the
decisions defining citizenship, as it is in the Court's domestic decisions de-
fining parenthood. Significantly, while the citizen and the domestic families
overlap in core respects, they are nevertheless distinct for the purpose of
determining if, and how, they are to merge, by both Congress and the Court.
352 In the immigration context, the political nature of regulating the family is espe-
cially salient in current proposals for reform that focus on reducing or eliminating family-
based immigration. See Editorial, Time to Strengthen Family Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
March 24, 2013, at A22 (supporting the importance of family unification in immigration
law, in the face of conservative political opposition to family-based immigration).
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